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**05AD459 U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: INTERAGENCY COORDINATION EFFORTS HAMPERED BY THE LACK OF A NATIONAL COMMUNICATION STRATEGY. [GAO-05-323]
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). April 4, 2005; Web-posted April 5, 2005.**

The war on terrorism has focused attention on the important role U.S. public diplomacy plays in improving the nation's image. The United States has undertaken efforts to "win hearts and minds" by better engaging, informing, and influencing foreign audiences; however, recent polling data show that anti-Americanism is spreading and deepening around the world. GAO was asked to examine (1) to what extent U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been coordinated and (2) whether the private sector has been significantly engaged in such efforts.

In 2003, an Office of Global Communications was created to facilitate White House and interagency efforts to communicate with foreign audiences. According to a recent report by the Defense Science Board [ADSURLS Item # 05AD124; http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf] and comments by agency officials, the office has not implemented this role. Although a national communications strategy has not yet been developed, the White House established the Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee in 2004 to coordinate public diplomacy efforts focused on Muslim audiences. The group is in the early phases of drafting strategic and tactical communications plans.

In addition to White House efforts, the State Department created an Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources in 2004 to help coordinate and direct the department's wide-ranging public diplomacy operations. Further, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Department of Defense are redefining their public diplomacy roles and operations in response to the increased attention given to U.S. outreach efforts. GAO notes that State has engaged the private sector in U.S. public diplomacy efforts, primarily in the area of international exchange programs. GAO adds, "However, other efforts led by State's Under Secretaries for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs to engage the private sector have not yielded significant results."

GAO recommends that (1) the Director of the Office of Global Communications fully implement the role mandated for the office in the President's executive order [establishing that office], including facilitating the development of a national communications strategy, and (2) the Secretary of State develop a strategy to guide department efforts to engage the private sector in pursuit of common public diplomacy objectives.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05323.pdf> [pdf format, 42 pages]

05AD458 SEPTEMBER 11: RECENT ESTIMATES OF FISCAL IMPACT OF 2001 TERRORIST ATTACK ON NEW YORK. [GAO-05-269]**United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). March 30, 2005; Web-posted April 5, 2005.**

In 2002, GAO reported that the New York budget offices estimated that from the terrorist attack, New York City sustained tax revenue losses of \$1.6 billion for 2002 and \$1.4 billion for 2003, New York State \$1.6 billion for 2002 and \$4.2 billion for 2003. GAO found some limitations to these local estimates, such as that it is likely that they included some of the economic recession under way in September 2001, as well as events after the attack, such as economic fallout from the Enron collapse and accounting firm improprieties. GAO was asked to update its report to ascertain whether the recent government studies using revised economic data would provide more precise information on the fiscal impact of the terrorist attack. In doing this work, GAO did not independently estimate the attack's impact on New York tax revenues.

Three recent studies by New York government agencies concluded that the 2001 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center significantly reduced tax revenues in fiscal years 2002 and 2003. But their estimates of forgone tax revenues—\$2.5 billion to \$2.9 billion for New York City and about \$2.9 billion for New York State—are generally less than previous estimates of forgone tax revenues. For example, the study completed in 2004 found, from revised economic data, that the economic recession that began before the attack generally had a greater impact on reducing New York tax revenues than initially projected.

While the revised economic data indicate that New York's economy was generally weaker before the attack than initially expected, inherent uncertainties and data limitations still prevent the estimates from being precise.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05269.pdf> [pdf format, 25 pages]

05AD456 DEFENSE TRADE: ARMS EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM IN THE POST-9/11 ENVIRONMENT. [GAO-05-234]**United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). February 16, 2005; Web-posted April 7, 2005.**

The U.S. government controls arms exports by U.S. companies to ensure that such exports are consistent with national security and foreign policy interests. There have been various efforts to change the arms export control system, which is overseen by the State Department (State).

Since the September 2001 terror attacks, the arms export control system has remained essentially unchanged, although new trends have emerged in the processing of arms export cases. The median processing time for export license applications and related cases began increasing in fiscal year 2003. State and the Department of Defense (Defense), which reviews export licenses, have continued to implement, through regulations and guidance, several initiatives primarily designed to streamline the processing of arms export licenses. According to State officials, they have not evaluated the effects of these initiatives on the export control system or revised the initiatives. However, applications processed under these initiatives have generally not been processed within the time frames established by State and Defense. For example, applications for Operation Iraqi Freedom are to be processed in 4 days if they require interagency review, but the median processing time for these applications in the first 7 months of fiscal year 2004 was 22 days.

State has sought limited coordination with the agencies responsible for enforcing U.S. arms export laws--the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice--regarding the initiatives designed to streamline arms export licensing. The only exceptions have been regarding proposed export licensing exemptions. Enforcement officials have raised concerns regarding licensing exemptions, including difficulties in enforcing the proper use of exemptions and the increased risk of diversion. According to enforcement officials, they face a number of challenges associated with arms export enforcement efforts, such as limited resources to conduct inspections and investigations and other difficulties in obtaining a criminal conviction for export violations.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05234.pdf> [pdf format, 94 pages]

05AD451 REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON HIGH PERFORMANCE MICROCHIP SUPPLY. United States Department of Defense, Defense Science Board (DSB). Task Force on High Performance Microchip Supply. February 2005; Web-posted March 2005.

Most leading edge microchip wafer production facilities (foundries), with the exception so far of IBM and possibly Texas Instruments, are controlled and located outside the United States. The driving forces behind the “alienation” of foundry business from the United States to other countries include the lower cost of capital available in developing countries, through foreign nations’ tax, market access requirements, subsidized infrastructure and financing incentives (including ownership), and the worldwide portability of technical skills, equipment and process know-how.

According to this report, “The Department of Defense (DOD) and its suppliers face a major integrated circuit supply dilemma that threatens the security and integrity of classified and sensitive circuit design information, the superiority and correct functioning of electronic systems, system reliability, continued supply of long system-life and special technology components.” The Defense Science Board presents recommendations to avoid a shortage in the supply of microchips to the DOD.

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2005-02-HPMS_Report_Final.pdf [pdf format, 118 pages]

05AD445 REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES [ON U.S. INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES REGARDING WMD].

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. Web-posted March 31, 2005.

On February 6, 2004, President Bush signed Executive Order 13328, which created this Commission and charged it with assessing whether the Intelligence Community is sufficiently authorized, organized, equipped, trained, and resourced to identify and warn the United States Government of threats related to the development and transfer of knowledge, expertise, technologies, materials, and resources associated with the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The Commission’s members conclude in this report “that the Intelligence Community was dead wrong in almost all of its pre-war judgments about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. This was a major intelligence failure. Its principal causes were the Intelligence Community’s inability to collect good information about Iraq’s WMD programs, serious errors in analyzing what information it could gather, and a failure to make clear just how much of its analysis was based on assumptions, rather than good evidence. On a matter of this importance, we simply cannot afford failures of this magnitude.” The Commission states that they found no evidence that CIA or other intelligence experts fabricated or distorted evidence. Rather, the Commission says of the intelligence community: “They were wrong.”

The report outlines 74 recommendations to improve the U.S. Intelligence Community’s ability to better manage its information collection, analysis and dissemination, including the following recommendations directed specifically to the president:

- * Give the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) the powers needed to match his responsibilities. “The new intelligence law makes the DNI responsible for integrating the 15 independent members of the Intelligence Community. But it gives him powers that are only relatively broader than before. The DNI cannot make this work unless he takes his legal authorities over budget, programs, personnel, and priorities to the limit. It won’t be easy to provide this leadership to the intelligence components of the Defense Department, or to the CIA. They are some of the government’s most headstrong agencies. Sooner or later, they will try to run around--or over--the DNI. Then, only [the president’s] determined backing will convince them that we cannot return to the old ways.”
- * Bring the FBI all the way into the Intelligence Community, by bringing the counterterrorism and counterintelligence resources of the Bureau into a single National Security Service inside the FBI.
- * Demand more of the Intelligence Community, by pushing them “to the point of discomfort” in challenging

them to explain intelligence gaps, for example.

Full Text:

http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf [pdf format, 618 pages]

Table of Contents:

<http://www.wmd.gov/report/index.html> [sections available in pdf and html format, various pagings]

05AD444 DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS: ASSESSMENTS OF SELECTED MAJOR WEAPON PROGRAMS. [GAO-05-301] United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). March 31, 2005.

The Department of Defense (DOD) is embarking on a number of efforts to enhance warfighting and the way the department conducts business. Major investments are being made to develop improved weapon systems to combat various threats to U.S. security. GAO notes that weapon systems acquisition remains a long-standing high-risk area. GAO's reviews over the past 30 years have found consistent problems with weapon acquisitions such as cost increases, schedule delays, and performance shortfalls. In addition, DOD faces several budgetary challenges that underscore the need to deliver its new major weapon programs within estimated costs and to obtain the most from those investments. GAO believes that DOD can help resolve these problems by using a more knowledge-based approach for developing new weapons.

In this report GAO assesses 54 weapons acquisitions programs, which represent an investment of over \$800 billion, ranging from the Missile Defense Agency's Airborne Laser to the Army's Warfighter Information Network-Tactical.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05301.pdf> [pdf format, 150 pages]

05AD423 NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. United States Department of Defense (DoD). March 18, 2005.

The National Military Strategy (NMS) is in essence a message from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff "to the Joint Force on the strategic direction the Armed Forces of the United States should follow to support the National Security and Defense Strategies in this time of war." The NMS defines specific tasks for the Joint Force that allow commanders to assess military and strategic risk. It guides adjustments to plans and programs to generate, employ and sustain joint capabilities effectively. Additionally, it provides insights on operational matters, institutional issues, force management programs and future challenges and recommends courses of action to mitigate risk.

The NMS sets forth three military objectives:

- * Protect the U.S. against external attacks and aggression;
- * Prevent conflict and surprise attack;
- * Prevailing against adversaries.

The document concludes that the strategy outlined in the document "focuses the Armed Forces on winning the [War on Terrorism] WOT and enhancing joint warfighting while supporting actions to create a joint, network-centric, distributed force, capable of full spectrum dominance. Achieving decision superiority and generating tailored effects across the battlespace allows the Joint Force to control any situation over a range of military operations. To succeed, the Armed Forces must integrate Service capabilities in new and innovative, reduce seams between combatant commands and develop more collaborative relationships with partners at home and abroad."

<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf> [pdf format, 38 pages]

**05AD422 NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
United States Department of Defense (DoD). March 18, 2005.**

The National Defense Strategy (NDS) defines the Department of Defense's (DoD's) strategic objectives: securing the U.S. from direct attack; securing strategic access and retaining freedom of action; strengthening alliances and partnerships; and establishing security conditions conducive to a favorable international order.

The Secretary of Defense outlines the following strategic objectives in this document:

- * Secure the United States from direct attack, especially extremist enemies with weapons of mass destruction.
- * Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of action by securing access to key regions, lines of communications, and the global commons.
- * Strengthen alliances and partnerships.
- * Establish favorable security conditions by honoring security commitments and working with other nations to bring about a common appreciation of threats.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf> [pdf format, 24 pages]

**05AD416 HOMELAND SECURITY: MUCH IS BEING DONE TO PROTECT AGRICULTURE FROM
A TERRORIST ATTACK, BUT IMPORTANT CHALLENGES REMAIN. [GAO-05-214]
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). March 8, 2005.**

Since the September 11, 2001 attacks there are new concerns about the vulnerability of U.S. agriculture to the deliberate introduction of animal and plant diseases (agroterrorism). Several agencies, including the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Department of Defense (DOD), play a role in protecting the nation against agroterrorism. For this report GAO examined (1) the federal agencies' roles and responsibilities to protect against agroterrorism, (2) the steps that the agencies have taken to manage the risks of agroterrorism, and (3) the challenges and problems that remain.

On the positive side, GAO notes that USDA and the other agencies are coordinating development of plans and protocols to better manage the national response to terrorism, including agroterrorism, and, along with several states, have conducted exercises to test these new protocols and their response capabilities. Federal agencies also have been conducting vulnerability assessments of the agriculture infrastructure; have created networks of laboratories capable of diagnosing animal, plant, and human diseases; have begun efforts to develop a national veterinary stockpile that intends to include vaccines against foreign animal diseases; and have created new federal emergency coordinator positions to help states develop emergency response plans for the agriculture sector.

However, GAO also notes that the United States still faces several complex challenges that limit the nation's ability to quickly and effectively respond to a widespread attack on livestock and poultry:

- * Many U. S. veterinarians lack training needed to recognize the signs of foreign animal diseases.
- * USDA does not use rapid diagnostic tools to test animals at the site of an outbreak. They employ this technology only in selected laboratories.
- * Vaccines cannot be deployed within 24 hours of an outbreak. First, supplies are limited because USDA maintains vaccines for only one foreign animal disease—foot and mouth disease—since this disease is so highly contagious. USDA generally prefers to immediately slaughter diseased animals rather than to vaccinate them. Also, these vaccines cannot be rapidly deployed because they are not stored in a “ready-to-use” state and would first need to be sent to the United Kingdom for bottling and testing.
- * States are not receiving sufficient technical federal assistance in developing emergency response plans and other activities to effectively prepare them to deal with agroterrorism.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05214.pdf> [pdf format, 101 pages]

05AD413 “CHURCH REPORT”. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, UNCLASSIFIED. [REVIEW OF U.S. DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DETENTION OPERATIONS AND INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES]**Albert T. Church III.****United States Department of Defense (DOD). Web-posted March 10, 2005.**

In May 2004, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed the Naval Inspector General, Vice Admiral Albert T. Church, III, to conduct a comprehensive review of Department of Defense (DoD) interrogation operations. Last week Vice Admiral Church presented his team’s findings to the U.S. Senate’s Armed Services Committee. The full classified report is almost 400 pages. This abbreviated version was released by the Pentagon for the public.

The report concludes: “It bears emphasis that the vast majority of detainees held by the U.S. in the Global War on Terror have been treated humanely, and that the overwhelming majority of U.S. personnel have served honorably. For those few who have not, there is no single, overarching explanation. While authorized interrogation techniques have not been a causal factor in detainee abuse, we have nevertheless identified a number of missed opportunities in the policy development process. We cannot say that there would necessarily have been less detainee abuse had these opportunities been acted upon. These are opportunities, however, that should be considered in the development of future interrogation policies.”

<http://www.pentagon.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050310exe.pdf> [pdf format, 21 pages]

05AD415 GUN CONTROL AND TERRORISM: FBI COULD BETTER MANAGE FIREARM-RELATED BACKGROUND CHECKS INVOLVING TERRORIST WATCH LIST RECORDS. [GAO-05-127]**United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). January 19, 2005; Web-posted March 8, 2005.**

Under current law in the United States, membership in a terrorist organization does not prohibit a person from owning a gun. Thus, during presale screening of prospective firearms purchasers, the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) historically did not utilize terrorist watch list records. However, for homeland security and other purposes, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and applicable state agencies began receiving notices (effective February 3, 2004) when such screening involved watch lists records. GAO determined (1) how many background checks have resulted in valid matches with terrorist watch list records, (2) procedures for providing federal counterterrorism officials relevant information from valid-match background checks, and (3) the extent to which the FBI monitors or audits the states’ handling of such checks.

During the period GAO reviewed—February 3 through June 30, 2004—a total of 44 firearm-related background checks handled by the FBI and applicable state agencies resulted in valid matches with terrorist watch list records. Of this total, 35 transactions were allowed to proceed because the background checks found no prohibiting information, such as felony convictions, illegal immigrant status, or other disqualifying factors.

GAO’s research revealed that federal and state procedures for handling terrorism-related NICS transactions do not clearly address the specific types of information that can or should be routinely provided to counterterrorism officials or the sources from which such information can be obtained. For example, under current procedures, it is not clear if certain types of potentially useful information, such as the residence address of the prospective purchaser, can or should be routinely shared. Also, under current procedures, it is not clear if FBI and state personnel can routinely call a gun dealer or a law enforcement agency processing a permit application to obtain and provide counterterrorism officials with information not submitted as part of the initial NICS check. Furthermore, some types of information—such as the specific location of the dealer from which the prospective purchaser attempted to obtain the firearm—have not been consistently shared with counterterrorism officials. GAO argues that consistently sharing the maximum amount of allowable information could provide counterterrorism officials with valu-

able new information about individuals on terrorist watch lists.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05127.pdf> [pdf format, 43 pages]

05AD407 UNITED NATIONS: SUSTAINED OVERSIGHT IS NEEDED FOR REFORMS TO ACHIEVE LASTING RESULTS. [GAO-05-392T]

United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). Web-posted March 2, 2005.

As the largest financial contributor to the United Nations, the United States has a strong interest in the completion of the Secretary General's reforms outlined in 1997, 2002 and, more recently, with the Oil for Food program. GAO provides observations on areas for U.N. reform based on its 2004 report [see ADSURLS Item# 04AD375; <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04339.pdf>] and GAO's continuing review of the Oil for Food program. This GAO report finds that the United Nations needs sustained oversight at all levels of the organization to achieve lasting results on its reform agenda. One major delay is the finding that the Secretariat had not periodically conducted comprehensive assessments of the status and impact of its reforms. Accordingly, the Secretariat had not been able to determine what progress had been made or where future improvements were needed. GAO says that the United Nations has completed the initial phase of implementing reforms in a key area—performance-based budgeting: “[The United Nations] adopted a budget that reflects a result-based budgeting format, including specific program costs, objectives, expected results, and performance indicators to measure results. However, the United Nations has yet to implement the next critical step in performance-based budgeting—a system to monitor and evaluate program impact or results. Program reviews that compare actual performance to expected outcomes are important for accounting for resources and achieving effective results.” GAO plans to conduct further analysis of the role of internal auditors in the United Nations system.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05392t.pdf> [pdf format, 18 pages]

05AD419 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES. VOLUME V: FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1969-1976. UNITED NATIONS, 1969-1972.

Evan M. Duncan, Editor.

United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs. Office of the Historian. Web-posted February 25, 2005.

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major U. S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity. The series, which is produced by the State Department's Office of the Historian, began in 1861 and now comprises more than 350 individual volumes. The volumes published over the last two decades increasingly contain declassified records from all the foreign affairs agencies. This volume presents the record of the policy of the first administration of President Richard Nixon towards the United Nations, including a variety of issues related to the membership, management, funding, and operation of that organization.

When the UN policy on Chinese representation in the organization intersected with Nixon's and Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger's primary objective of opening relations with the People's Republic of China, they became involved in the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. On such high-profile issues as the selection of a new UN Secretary General to succeed U Thant, they also took an active interest in the process that eventually resulted in the selection of Kurt Waldheim of Austria. These are the primary concerns of the White House that are reflected in the documentation presented in this volume.

Other major issues also covered in the volume:

* U.S. concern with the radical tone of the Committee of 24 on Decolonization and the U.S. decision to withdraw

from the Committee.

* The desire by members to hold periodic Security Council meetings and other meetings outside of the UN forum in New York.

* The perennial problem of the U.S. share in funding the virtually bankrupt United Nations.

* The selection of UN officials below the Secretary General level.

* A variety of other questions involved in specific issues, such as the expansion of UN headquarters, the commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the UN, and the security of UN missions. Before he was elected President, George H. W. Bush served as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from March 1971 through 1973. Many of the documents provide insight into his role in the Nixon Administration and his tenure as head of the U.S. mission.

<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/v/index.htm> [Table of Contents page, sections in html format, various pagings]

05AD333 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS NEED BETTER INTEGRATION. [GAO-05-157]

United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). January 28, 2005.

Since 1992, the Congress has provided more than \$7 billion for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in the former Soviet Union (FSU). These programs have played a key role in addressing the threats of weapons of mass destruction and are currently expanding beyond the FSU. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004 mandated that GAO assess (1) Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE) strategies guiding their threat reduction and nonproliferation programs and (2) efforts to coordinate DOD, DOE, and Department of State threat reduction and nonproliferation programs that share similar missions.

In this report GAO finds that there is no overall strategy that integrates the threat reduction and nonproliferation programs of the DOD, DOE, and others. DOD and DOE have strategies governing their respective programs, which generally contain the elements of a strategy as established by the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. These strategies include a mission statement and goals, identification of external factors that could affect meeting these goals, establishment of metrics to evaluate the performance of the programs, provision of cost estimates, and coverage over a period of at least 5 years. Given the involvement of multiple agencies, and the expansion of the threat reduction and nonproliferation programs beyond the FSU, integration of agencies' strategies is important.

GAO found that the agencies' implementation of very similar programs has not always been well coordinated. While the majority of programs in DOD and DOE are distinct, GAO found three program areas that perform similar functions in the FSU. GAO found that the coordination of programs enhancing security at Russian nuclear warhead sites improved after the National Security Council (NSC) staff issued guidance. Specifically, the guidance delineates agencies' roles, interactions, and ways to resolve disputes. The biological weapons scientist employment programs in DOD, DOE, and State are well coordinated and also have NSC staff guidance addressing roles, interactions, and disputes. By contrast, there is no government-wide guidance delineating the roles and responsibilities of agencies managing border security programs. According to DOD and DOE officials managing these programs, agencies' roles are not well delineated and coordination could be improved.

<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05157.pdf> [pdf format, 48 pages]

Congressional Documents (Hearings, reports, etc.)**05AD467 DETENTION OF AMERICAN CITIZENS AS ENEMY COMBATANTS. [RL31724]****Jennifer K. Elsea.****Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated February 24, 2005.**

The law of war divides persons in the midst of an armed conflict into two broad categories: combatants and civilians. This fundamental distinction determines the international legal status of persons participating in or affected by combat, and determines the legal protections afforded to such persons as well as the legal consequences of their conduct. To limit exposure of civilians to military attacks, combatants are required, as a general rule, to distinguish themselves from civilians. Combatants who fail to distinguish themselves from civilians run the risk of being denied the privilege to be treated as prisoners of war if captured by the enemy.

This report analyzes the authority to detain American citizens who are suspected of being members, agents, or associates of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, or other terrorist organizations as “enemy combatants.” In June 2004, the Supreme Court issued three decisions related to the detention of “enemy combatants.” In *Rasul v. Bush* [see: <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/03pdf/03-334.pdf>], the Court held that aliens detained at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, have access to federal courts to challenge their detention. In *Hamdi v. Rumsfeld* [see: <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/03pdf/03-6696.pdf>], a plurality held that a U.S. citizen allegedly captured during combat in Afghanistan and incarcerated at a Navy brig in South Carolina was entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard by a neutral decision-maker regarding the government’s reasons for detaining him. The government instead reached an agreement with the petitioner that allowed him to return to Saudi Arabia, where he also holds citizenship, subject to certain conditions. The Court in *Rumsfeld v. Padilla* [see: <http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/03pdf/03-1027.pdf>] overturned a lower court’s grant of habeas corpus to another U. S. citizen in military custody in South Carolina on jurisdictional grounds, sending the case to a district court in the Fourth Circuit for a new trial.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31724.pdf> [pdf format, 54 pages]

05AD450 FOREIGN AFFAIRS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 2006 AND 2007. [Senate Report 109-035]**United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. March 10, 2005.**

Senate Foreign Relations Committee report to the full Senate on S.600, “An original bill to authorize appropriations for the Department of State and international broadcasting activities for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, for the Peace Corps for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, for foreign assistance programs for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and for other purposes.” [Note: For text of the legislation itself, see: <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c109:S.600>:]

The bill authorizes appropriations for the President's foreign affairs budget within the jurisdiction of the committee at the level he requested. It represents a 13 percent increase over last year's appropriated level and a 10.7 percent increase, as calculated by the Congressional Budget Office, over last year's baseline amount.

Among the highlights of this committee report are the following proposals:

- * The Stabilization and Reconstruction Civilian Management Act, to build Department of State capacity to organize and lead the civilian component of stabilization and reconstruction missions overseas.
- * The Protection of Vulnerable Populations during Humanitarian Emergencies Act of 2005 includes provisions designed to improve protections for women, children, and other vulnerable populations in the context of war or disaster.
- * The Safe Water: Currency for Peace Act of 2005 recognizes that safe water and sanitation, sound water man-

agement, and improved hygiene for people around the world is an essential ingredient of U.S. foreign policy objectives. It authorizes a 5-year pilot program to assist countries that have a high rate of water-borne illness, with alternative funding mechanisms such as investment insurance, investment guarantees or loan guarantees to develop sustainable water infrastructure systems.

* The Global Pathogen Surveillance Act of 2005 acknowledges that the threat of bioterrorism or the potential spread of such dangerous diseases as SARS and Avian flu poses significant challenges not only for the United States, but also for the entire world.

* The bill includes executive branch initiatives targeting democracy, governance and economic development in the Middle East. Authorization of appropriations for the State Department's Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) is increased from \$89 million to \$150 million. The National Endowment for Democracy budget is increased by one-third to \$80 million to continue the President's Greater Middle East Democracy Initiative. The bill contains \$150 million of the funds pledged by the President in his State of the Union address for programs in the West Bank and Gaza.

* Improving U.S. public diplomacy is a clear priority for the committee. With the successful Iraqi elections, the widely known and generous American response to the tsunami tragedy, and new optimism on the Israeli-Palestinian front, there is an opportunity to shape wavering international opinion of U.S. goals and values. The bill provides the authorization for an increase of \$8 million in the Diplomatic and Consular account to be spent on public diplomacy, \$430.4 million for Educational and Cultural Exchanges (an increase of \$74.5 million), and \$651.9 million for international broadcasting (an increase of \$60.3 million).

* One of the largest increases in authorized amounts in the bill is for the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). The request is for \$3 billion, a 100 percent increase over last year's appropriation. The committee did not approve an amendment to defer such a large increase in funding for the MCC and distribute the \$427 million cut among other foreign aid accounts. While views on the specific amendment varied, the debate demonstrated strong committee support for the MCC's long-term mission to boost economic development in the poorest, but most likely-to-succeed countries.

* The bill also focuses resources on the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_reports&docid=f:sr035.109.pdf
[pdf format, 129 pages]

[http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cp109:FLD010:@1\(sr035\)](http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/R?cp109:FLD010:@1(sr035)) [Table of Contents, sections in html format, various pagings]

05AD464 PALESTINIANS AND MIDDLE EAST PEACE: ISSUES FOR THE UNITED STATES. [IB92052]

Clyde Mark.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated March 7, 2005.

According to the "road map" for the "quartet" peace plan (Europe, Russia, U.N., U.S.A.), presented on April 30, 2003, the Israelis and Palestinians must take steps to implement the plan, but it was not clear if the steps were to be sequential (the Israeli view) or in parallel (the Palestinian view). During stage one of phase one, the Israelis were to end attacks on Palestinian cities, house demolitions, and deportations; to freeze settlement activity; and to dismantle settlements established since February 2001. The Palestinians were to name a new cabinet (approved February 24, 2005) and Prime Minister (sworn in April 30, 2003), end violence against Israelis, and consolidate the Palestinian police forces. During stage two of phase one, Israelis were to withdraw to the September 28, 2000 lines and freeze all settlement activity. The Palestinians and the Israelis were to sign a new security agreement. The Palestinians will hold elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council in the summer of 2005. During phase two, the quartet was to establish a monitoring system to monitor compliance with the agreement

and was to hold an international conference on Palestinian economic recovery. The quartet also will sponsor negotiations for a Palestinian state within provisional borders. During phase three, scheduled to begin in 2004, Israel and the Palestinians were to agree on a provisional Palestinian state and, by the beginning of 2005, were to resume negotiations for permanent borders, Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, and other issues.

In his State of the Union Address, President Bush said he would request \$350 million for the Palestinians, \$150 million in the FY2006 budget and \$200 million in the FY2005 supplemental request. On February 3, the Administration notified Congress that \$41 million in West Bank/Gaza assistance in the pipeline would be freed for immediate Palestinian use.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/IB92052.pdf> [pdf format, 19 pages]

05AD462 U.S. EMBASSY IN IRAQ. [RS21867]

Susan B. Epstein.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated March 11, 2005.

The Bush Administration is in the process of establishing a new embassy in Baghdad with regional offices throughout Iraq. The President has requested more than \$1.3 billion in its FY2005 supplemental request for the logistical, security and construction costs associated with the embassy. In 2005, even before it is built and fully staffed, this embassy is the largest worldwide in both staff size and budget. As of June 28, 2004 sovereignty officially was transferred to the Iraqi interim government. At the same time, the lines of U.S. government authority in Iraq were transferred from the Department of Defense (DoD), the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and Ambassador Paul Bremer to the Department of State (DoS), the United States Embassy in Baghdad, and the newly-confirmed Ambassador John Negroponte. This report discusses reestablishing diplomatic ties with Iraq and setting up the new embassy and regional teams.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS21867.pdf> [pdf format, 6 pages]

05AD461 U.S. DEFENSE ARTICLES AND SERVICES SUPPLIED TO FOREIGN RECIPIENTS: RESTRICTIONS ON THEIR USE. [RL30982] Richard F. Grimmett.

Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Updated March 14, 2005.

The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), as amended, authorizes the transfer by sale or lease of United States origin defense articles and services through the government-to-government foreign military sales (FMS) program or through the licensed commercial sales process. Section 3(a) of the Arms Export Control Act sets the general standards for countries or international organizations to be eligible to receive United States defense articles and defense services provided under this act. It also sets express conditions on the uses to which these defense items may be put. Section 4 of AECA states that defense articles and defense services shall be sold to friendly countries "solely for":

- * "internal security";
- * "legitimate self-defense";
- * enabling the recipient to participate in "regional or collective arrangements or measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations";
- * enabling the recipient to participate in "collective measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace and security";
- * enabling the foreign military forces "in less developed countries to construct public works and to engage in other activities helpful to the economic and social development of such friendly countries."

Section 3(c)(2) of the Arms Export Control Act requires the President to report promptly to the Congress upon the receipt of information that a “substantial violation” described in section 3(c)(1) of the AECA “may have occurred.” This Presidential report need not reach any conclusion regarding the possible violation or provide any particular data other than that necessary to illustrate that the President has received information indicating a specific country may have engaged in a “substantial violation” of an applicable agreement with the United States that governs the sale of U.S. defense articles or services. Since the major revision of U.S. arms export law in 1976, neither the President nor the Congress have actually determined that a violation did occur, thus necessitating the termination of deliveries or sales or other penalties set out in section 3 of AECA.

The United States Government has other options under the Arms Export Control Act to prevent transfer of defense articles and services for which valid contracts exist short of finding a foreign country in violation of an applicable agreement with the United States. These options include suspension of deliveries of defense items already ordered and refusal to allow new arms orders. The United States has utilized at least one such option against Argentina, Israel, Indonesia, and Turkey.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL30982.pdf> [pdf format, 10 pages]

Think Tanks and International Organizations

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

05AD411 UNIVERSAL COMPLIANCE: A STRATEGY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY.

George Perkovich, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller and Jon Wolfsthal. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 2005.

Initially released in June 2004 for worldwide review, this new and final version of the report incorporates input from experts and officials in the United States and 20 countries across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, the former Soviet States, and Russia. The final report captures the varying national interests driving non-proliferation policies.

The authors present six obligations that they say form the core of the universal compliance strategy: * Make Non-proliferation Irreversible.

* Devalue the Political and Military Currency of Nuclear Weapons.

* Secure All Nuclear Materials.

* Stop Illegal Transfers.

* Commit to Conflict Resolution.

* Solve the Three-State Problem. Persuade India, Israel, and Pakistan to accept the same nonproliferation obligations accepted by the weapon state signatories to the NPT.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/UC2.FINAL3.pdf> [pdf format, 226 pages]

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)

AL-QAEDA IN SAUDI ARABIA. ASYMMETRIC THREATS AND ISLAMIST EXTREMISTS.

Anthony H. Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Revised January 26, 2005.

This report claims that although Al Qaeda has killed people in Saudi Arabia and damaged the Kingdom's economy, it has not been able to get as strong a grip as it would like. The authors argue that Al Qaeda has been unsuccessful in its recruiting efforts, has failed to define a viable alternative to the existing government structure, and has been deprived of enough funding to build strong. But the group remains powerful both inside and outside the Kingdom. Despite being able to keep some facets at bay, say the authors, "Saudi Arabia is at a critical juncture in its fight against terrorism. The threat is unlikely to disappear for years to come. Al Qaeda can draw on Saudis in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Central Asia, as well as other members of al-Qaeda who may be able to enter Saudi Arabia. The Iraqi and Yemeni borders present serious problems in terms of infiltration."

The authors say that the roots of attraction for Islamic extremism are not easily eradicated without dealing with the sources of unrest. The Saudi government must do more, they say, to open up opportunities in the Kingdom for those who have been denied any voice in the economic and political systems that hold powerful sway.

http://www.csis.org/burke/reports/050106_Al-QaedainSaudi.pdf [pdf format, 25 pages]

HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Slow But Steady Progress in Iraq

by James Phillips

WebMemo #725 April 15, 2005

Pessimists have been repeatedly wrong about the prospects for postwar political progress in Iraq. They doubted that the Iraqis would finish writing an interim constitution on time in 2003; they doubted that sovereignty could be transferred to an interim Iraqi government by that constitution's deadline in 2004; and they doubted that elections could be conducted on the constitution's ambitious timetable, in January 2005. They were wrong on all counts. And now they bemoan Iraq's relatively slow progress in forming a transitional government after the January 30th elections.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/wm725.cfm?renderforprint=1>

The Army Reserves and the Abrams Doctrine: Unfulfilled Promise, Uncertain Future

by James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.

Heritage Lecture #869 April 18, 2005

The Abrams Doctrine is widely interpreted as an expression of General Creighton Abrams's determination to maintain a clear linkage between the employment of the Army and the engagement of public support for military operations. Abrams, according to the doctrine, established this bond by creating a force structure that integrated Reserve1 and Active Components so closely as to make them inextricable, ensuring after Vietnam that Presidents would never again send the Army to war without the Reserves and the commitment of the American people.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl869.cfm>

The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century**by Baker Spring and Kathy Gudgel****WebMemo #721 April 13, 2005**

There has been considerable debate over nuclear weapons research programs—such as the Modern Pit facility, Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, Enhanced Test Readiness, and Advanced Concepts—in the wake of Congress's decision to cut their funding. Although it is unclear whether funding will be restored, some members of Congress are clearly unwilling or unable to understand the evolving role of nuclear weapons in modern national security. At a recent Heritage Foundation event, a panel of experts examined the role of nuclear weapons in the 21st century and their requirements, such as delivery systems, warhead designs, and technology.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm721.cfm?renderforprint=1>

INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**ISIS [INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY] IMAGERY BRIEFS:**

- 1) IRAN CONSTRUCTING THE 40 MW HEAVY WATER REACTOR AT ARAK DESPITE CALLS NOT TO DO SO BY THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS [MARCH 4, 2005];**
- 2) NEW SATELLITE IMAGES SHOW TUNNEL CONSTRUCTION AT ESFAHAN FACILITY IN IRAN [FEBRUARY 17, 2005]. Institute for Science and International Security [ISIS]. Web- posted March 4, 2005.**

Satellite photos of controversial nuclear facilities in Iran.

Images, March 4, 2005:

<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/arakconstruction.html> [html format, photos in jpg format] Images, February 17, 2005:

<http://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/esfahantunnels.html> [html format, photos in jpg format.

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY (NDU)**05AD465 NATO EXPEDITIONARY OPERATIONS: IMPACTS ON NEW MEMBERS AND PARTNERS. [NDU/INSS Occasional Paper No. 1] Jeffrey Simon.**

National Defense University (NDU), Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). March 2005.

In an effort to make European troops more employable in out-of-area (OOA) operations, the United States has urged NATO to set goals of having each member nation able to deploy 40 percent of its forces abroad, with at least 8 percent of each nation's military actually deployed at any given time. The motivation behind this idea is to help sustain the ongoing shift from reliance on territorial defenses during the Cold War to expeditionary forces in the post-September 11 era. Even so, says the author, this objective may be exceedingly difficult for new NATO members to achieve, given the competing budgetary and political pressures to which they are subjected. To successfully develop more expeditionary capability, Simon argues that discussions of a new defense and force planning approach might include the following issues:

- * NATO military authorities need to provide specific advice for specialized force planning, as increasing reliance on expeditionary operations has demonstrated that the Cold War concept of “national responsibility” for territorial defense forces is no longer useful.
- * NATO military authorities and/or individual member governments should provide international training support (especially for counterterrorism operations) and develop a new approach to multinational formations.
- * NATO should develop a new system to finance international military operations.
- * NATO needs to focus on public information methods to provide contributing nations with sufficient information more effectively to sustain public support for military operations far from home.
- * NATO needs to work with the European Union to explore how defense ministry activities in support of post-conflict and counterterrorism-related missions could be more closely coordinated with the ongoing work of interior ministries.
- * The United States and European NATO allies need to engage in a transatlantic dialogue that addresses the resulting limitations and obligations of Article 5 in the new post–September 11 environment.

http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/Occasional_Papers/SIMON_OP_032005.pdf [pdf format, 46 pages]

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (NWC)

05AD468 CHINA'S NUCLEAR FORCE MODERNIZATION. [Newport Papers No. 22]

Lyle J. Goldstein, Editor, with Andrew S. Erickson.

United States Navy. Naval War College (NWC)_2005.

In recent years U.S.-Sino cooperation has included counterterrorism initiatives, regional partnership in such complex situations as Afghanistan and North Korea, and even some modest agreement on the importance of maintaining the status quo with respect to Taiwan's status. A strong component of closer ties between the U.S. and China is the increasing trade relationship, which received a further boost from China's entry into the World Trade Organization in November 2001. In 2003, trade between the United States and China amounted to \$191.7 billion, up 23.2 percent from 2002. The United States is China's second most important trading partner nation (Japan is first).

The editors caution, however, that: “Despite noteworthy progress since 2001 in relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC), there are lingering tensions and disquieting signs that possible difficulties may loom on the horizon.” This study examines select aspects of China's nuclear modernization: developments in Chinese nuclear command and control (NC2); the recent launch of a new generation of Chinese strategic missile boats (SSBNs); the influence of China's space program on strategic nuclear modernization; Chinese countermeasures against U.S. ballistic missile defense. The chapters “paint a portrait of a strategic modernization program that is making steady strides. Beijing appears determined to upgrade its nuclear posture, even as it simultaneously prepares for local war under high tech conditions.”

<http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/npapers/np22/NP22.pdf> [pdf format, 138 pages]

RAND

The Challenge for NATO's Chairman

By Robert Hunter

This commentary appeared in the March/April 2005 issue of Frontline Canada.

It's no secret that the Bush administration and the Canadian government do not always see eye to eye on foreign

and defense policy. Canada was probably not regarded by US neo-cons as important enough to be put on the list of an allied “axis of appeasers” (such as France and Germany) for opposing the invasion of Iraq. And, while Ottawa has rated a brief US presidential visit since then, it has not been at the center of President George W. Bush's recent wooing of NATO allies.

Part of Washington's tendency to bypass Canada when the big agenda of security is under discussion is because our northern neighbor is regarded as a relatively small player, at NATO and elsewhere. “Not that small,” Canadians will quickly respond, especially when it comes to peacekeeping and peacemaking.

<http://www.rand.org/commentary/031005FCM.html>

05AD455 TOWARD A REVOLUTION IN INTELLIGENCE AFFAIRS.

Deborah G. Barger.

RAND. Web-posted April 8, 2005.

As the global war on terrorism continues to expand and the post-Cold War security environment remains in flux, both the strengths and weaknesses of U.S. intelligence have been thrust into the public spotlight. The author advances the argument that a “Revolution in Intelligence Affairs” is needed to prepare the Intelligence Community to meet its future challenges. In this report, she presents a framework for how the United States should consider specific changes to its intelligence enterprise to improve its effectiveness. The framework is designed to allow intelligence leaders to:

- * Holistically evaluate proposed changes to a complex system (i.e., avoid fixing one thing while inadvertently breaking another).
- * Evaluate proposals for change objectively and from something other than a political or bureaucratic perspective.
- * Develop their own proposals for change, driven by rapid changes in the external environment (rather than failures).
- * Follow an approach that will help the Intelligence Community succeed in actually implementing needed changes, not once but continuously.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR242.pdf [pdf format, 136 pages]

CHINA ON THE MOVE: A FRANCO-AMERICAN ANALYSIS OF EMERGING CHINESE STRATEGIC POLICIES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS.

David C. Gompert, Francois Godement, Evan S. Medeiros and James C. Mulvenon.

RAND. Web-posted March 9, 2005.

This report is the product of a conference, jointly sponsored by the RAND Corporation National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) and Centre Asie Ifri and held in Paris in June 2003. The chapters in the report were written by researchers from both organizations and subsequently edited to produce a mutually acceptable consensus document. The volume cited here represents a transatlantic view of Chinese national strategy and capabilities and offers a common path for engaging rising Chinese power. Its aim is not to compare official French, European, or U.S. approaches to China, but to examine the issues through the U.S.-French prism. This approach has facilitated analysis of how to develop a transatlantic, U.S.-Europe dimension of China policy.

The U.S. and the countries of Europe have different perspectives towards China. The authors note that “this suggests the possibility of a triangle--if a rather oddly shaped one--among China, Europe, and America, with a disquieting potential if translated into strategic maneuvering by each between the other two. Presently, neither the

United States nor the EU and its member states, including France, explicitly or implicitly base their relations with China on triangular calculations. Rather, the two follow parallel interests vis-à-vis China: utilizing its productive capacities, accessing its potentially vast market, committing it to international trade rules, and shaping its policies on nonproliferation, human rights, and environmental security.”

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

Full Report:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2005/RAND_CF199.pdf [pdf format, 66 pages]

Summary:

http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2005/RAND_CF199.sum.pdf [pdf format, 9 pages]

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

AFGHANISTAN: RECONSTITUTING A COLLAPSED STATE

Raymond A. Millen

April 2005

LTC Raymond A. Millen examines warlordism as the principal impediment to Afghanistan’s revival and offers a shift in strategy that addresses the war of ideas, the counternarcotics initiative, and the incorporation of the Afghan National Army into the provincial reconstruction teams. As Lieutenant Colonel Millen observes, all the resources are in place; they simply need a shift in focus.

LTC Millen takes into account the historical, cultural, and economic factors that impede central authority and the reforms needed for modern states. His problem-solving approach is insightful, pragmatic, and innovative.

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/display.cfm/hurl/PubID=600>

05AD452 SAUDI ARABIA: ISLAMIC THREAT, POLITICAL REFORM, AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR.

Sherifa D. Zuhur.

United States Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). March 2005.

This report examines the convergence of the war on terror on Saudi soil, calls for modest programs of political reform, and heightened post-9/11 tensions with the United States. Saudi Arabia has been condemned for its Wahhabist version of Islam, and linked to the growth of salafist extremism operating locally, regionally, and internationally. The author defines the background and nature of today’s Islamic threat in Saudi Arabia, and argues for continuing counter- and anti-terrorist measures as well as for political reform and development.

<http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdf/PUB598.pdf> [pdf format, 71 pages]

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

05AD442 RETHINKING TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS: LESSONS FROM SIERRA LEONE. [USIP Special Report No. 130]

Rosalind Shaw.

United States Institute of Peace (USIP). February 2005; Web-posted March 2005.

After an eleven-year civil war that became internationally notorious for mutilation, sexual violence, and the targeting of children, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) began its public hearings in April 2003. Ac-

According to the author, there was little popular support for bringing such a commission to Sierra Leone, since most ordinary people preferred a “forgive and forget” approach. In fact, she says, in northern Sierra Leone “social forgetting is a cornerstone of established processes of reintegration and healing for child and adult ex-combatants. Speaking of the war in public often undermines these processes, and many believe it encourages violence.” Shaw stresses the importance of documenting mass violence and human rights abuses, but advocates exploring alternatives to the TRC-type of process. Rather than use one particular TRC as a template, she says, organizers of this type of initiative should examine local practices of truth-telling, confrontation and reconciliation and incorporate these traditions into the idea of a forum for healing, conflict resolution and the building of more stable post-conflict institutions.

<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr130.pdf> [pdf format, 12 pages]

05AD440 QUICKSTEP OR KADAM TAAL? THE ELUSIVE SEARCH FOR PEACE IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR. [USIP Special Report No. 133]

Praveen Swami.

United States Institute of Peace (USIP). Web-posted March 2005.

The inhabitants of the Asian region of Jammu and Kashmir are embroiled in a dispute between India and Pakistan for control of the entire region. Each of those two countries controls a portion of the area. Since December 2003 India and Pakistan have maintained a successful cease-fire along the “Line of Control”, along which troops from both countries patrol their respective sides. This period of relative détente has given rise to the hope that India and Pakistan can finally achieve some kind of permanent resolution to this regional dispute.

The author cautions against trying to find a fast and comprehensive resolution. Rather, he argues that making a lasting peace is at best a protracted process. He argues that peacemaking would be better served by focusing on the needs of the people in the affected region -- “by turning attention away from the ‘Kashmir problem’ to the ‘problems of Kashmiris’.”

<http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr133.pdf> [pdf format, 12 pages]

WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY

IN SECURITY, REFORM, AND PEACE: THE THREE PILLARS OF U.S. STRATEGY THE MIDDLE EAST. [2005 PRESIDENTIAL STUDY GROUP REPORT]

Washington Institute for Near East Policy. February 17, 2005.

[Note: This report was endorsed by a fifty-three member bipartisan panel whose Steering Committee includes Madeleine Albright, Samuel Berger, Howard Berman, Roy Blunt, Leslie Gelb, Newt Gingrich, Alexander Haig, Max M. Kampelman, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Samuel Lewis, Joseph Lieberman, Robert McFarlane, R. James Woolsey, and Mortimer Zuckerman.]

According to this report, the United States is facing an extraordinary moment of challenge in the Middle East, one that demands an integrated U.S. strategy built on a set of three pillars: security, reform, and peace. If the United States wants not just to combat the threats it faces in the region but also to change the regional dynamic which produces such threats, the administration should also pursue political, social, and economic reform in Middle East countries and the promotion of a secure Arab-Israeli peace.

The authors outline what they consider to be the Bush administration’s most pressing Middle East priorities for 2005:

* Speeding the training and fielding of new Iraqi security forces while building the structure of a free and repre-

sentative Iraqi government.

- * Coordinating strategy on Iran's nuclear program with key European and Security Council powers.
- * Developing and implementing a comprehensive strategy to fight the ideological war against Islamist extremism.
- * Injecting presidential leadership into calls for political reform.
- * Investing in Palestinian political and security change and a peaceful and orderly Israeli disengagement from Gaza.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material.]

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/PSG2005.pdf> [pdf format, 102 pages]

A r t i c l e s f r o m U . S . J o u r n a l s

(Contact the IRC for copies)

AA05115 A NUCLEAR POSTURE FOR TODAY

Deutch, John

Foreign Affairs vol. 84, no. 1, January/February 2005, pp. 49-60

Summary: The author, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, feels that U.S. nuclear posture should be reflective of the current geo-political situation. The nature of nuclear threats has changed from a large-scale attack to the use of one or a few devices by a rogue nation. The U.S. should scale back its nuclear activity significantly, setting a security standard for other countries. The American nuclear posture must encourage international nonproliferation efforts without sacrificing the United States' ability to deter a nuclear attack. This article is currently available on the Internet at: <http://mit.edu/chemistry/deutch/policy/69NuclearPosture2004.pdf> [IS; VS]

AA05116 THE GUARD AND RESERVE IN AMERICA'S NEW MISSIONS

Hoffman, Frank G.

ORBIS vol. 49, no. 2, Spring 2005, pp. 213-228

Summary: LtCol Hoffman, USMC Reserve (ret.), a Research Fellow at the U.S. Marine Corps' Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, notes that, even before being mobilized in the war on terrorism, the National Guard and Reserve were stretched thin with peacekeeping and nation-building responsibilities that they acquired after the Cold War. Hoffman writes that the U.S. government lacks a strategy to guide the integration of all elements of the U.S. armed services, and has not yet fully grasped the fundamental shift in modern war, which has put a great deal of strain on the Guard and Reserves. He proposes a more flexible structure for the Guard and Reserves, with "traditional" war-fighting duties, stability and support operations, and homeland security, and recommends specific troop deployment numbers. [TEM;GWB]

AA05117 NUCLEAR TERRORISM: A BRIEF REVIEW OF THREATS AND RESPONSES

Medalia, Jonathan

Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service February 10, 2005, 17 pp.

Summary: It would be difficult for terrorists to mount a nuclear attack on a U.S. city, but such an attack is plausi-

ble and would have catastrophic consequences. Many experts believe that technically sophisticated terrorists could fabricate a nuclear bomb from highly enriched uranium. These bombs might be smuggled across lightly-guarded stretches of borders, shipped in a cargo container, placed in a crude oil tanker, or brought in by use of a truck, boat, or small airplane. Among potential responses by the U.S. are developing new detection technologies and strengthening U.S. intelligence capabilities. Available on the Internet at: <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/43399.pdf> [IS;GB]

AA05118 DISARMAMENT: HAVE THE FIVE NUCLEAR POWERS DONE ENOUGH?

Scheinman, Lawrence

Arms Control Today vol. 35, no. 1, January/February 2005, pp. 6-11

Summary: The author, who teaches at Georgetown University in Washington, DC and the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California, flags some of the controversial issues that will be on the table in New York during the month-long Review Conference (RevCon) of the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in May 2005. Scheinman raises the possibility that this RevCon, similar to some in the past, may not be able to secure a final consensus document. The conference must address existing security challenges, such as terrorism and treaty compliance. Scheinman, who served in the past as a high-ranking official at the State and Energy Departments and the former U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, outlines the recent concrete actions by the U.S. to fulfill its Article VI obligations as well as measures taken by France, China, Russia and the United Kingdom. This article is currently available on the Internet at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_01-02/Scheinman.asp [IS;JSP]

AA05103 REVERSING PROLIFERATION

Straus, Ira

National Interest no. 77, Fall 2004, pp. 63-70

Summary: Straus, U.S. coordinator of NATO's Independent International Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia, notes that WMD proliferation has attracted little public debate since 9/11, which he finds curious, since the invasion of Iraq was a mission of "counterproliferation." He writes that "the urgency of curbing proliferation has grown and standards, once lowered, are not easy to raise again." He argues that we must not be lenient on rogue states and those trying to acquire nuclear weapons. However, this does not imply a war-like campaign, says Straus, because "we can afford neither diplomacy without war nor war without diplomacy." He suggests that recent successes in Iraq have been due to coercive action supplemented with diplomacy. President Bush has announced a six-pronged initiative to strengthen the NPT regime, which includes efforts such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the creation of a new tier of states that do not enrich uranium. He believes that we cannot hope for universal disarmament, as was the initial hope of the NPT; he believes that a realistic goal would be for the nuclear powers to manage their arsenals better, take them off hair-trigger alert, coordinate them with joint planning, and even aim at their ultimate integration. He believes that it is up to the United States and Europe to take action before it's too late. [IS;KS]

AA05102 AL-QAEDA AND THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS TERRORISM

Sedgwick, Mark

Terrorism & Political Violence vol. 16, no. 4, Winter 2004, pp. 795-814

Summary: Sedgwick, a history professor at American University in Cairo, has examined the nature of religious terrorism with regard to the transnational terrorist group al-Qaeda. He argues that while the religious aspects of

al-Qaeda are significant, the nature of the history of terrorism practiced by al-Qaeda matters more. In religious terms, al-Qaeda has two key aims -- a state ruled by its chosen form of Islam, and the religious concepts it uses to appeal and motivate its operatives. Sedgwick believes, however, that its more immediate aims are the acquisition of political power, and are therefore the aims of any other terrorist group. He also notes that al-Qaeda is neither irrational nor incomprehensible in its actions. Understanding these distinctions, he suggests, are vital in combating the group's goals and objectives. [TIS;MDK]

AA05100 'THE ENEMY IS AT THE GATE': RUSSIA AFTER BESLAN

Lynch, Dov

International Affairs Vol. 81, No. 1, January 2005, pp. 141-161

Summary: The future of political and economic reforms in Russia is in serious doubt, according to Lynch, Senior Research Fellow at the European Union's Institute for Security Studies. As Vladimir Putin begins his second presidential term, the three-prong terrorist attacks of summer 2004 (most notably the Beslan school attack that left 326 dead) have had a decidedly negative impact on Russia's economic consolidation, Chechen War policy, military and internal security reforms, and counterterrorism policy. Despite Putin's significant achievements in his first term, polling shows that most Russians have not bought into his view that international terrorism has declared war on Mother Russia. "Moscow's insistence on absolute internal sovereignty and the secularization of domestic policy (represents) a perilous time for the Russian body of the state," Lynch concludes. [IS;JM]

AA05093 THE SILENT STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORIST FINANCING

Myers, Joseph M.

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter 2005, pp. 33-41

Summary: Myers, former Director of International Financial Affairs in the Office of Combating Terrorism on the Bush Administration's National Security Council, says that financial intelligence, investigations, prosecutions, sanctions and diplomacy can make a meaningful contribution to the security of the United States against the threat of Islamist terrorism. But, as long as people are motivated to commit acts of terrorism, he says, no actions designed to combat terrorist finance will ever eliminate the flow of funds. Furthermore, the effectiveness of U.S.-initiated sanctions and other actions are limited by the extent to which they are supported and implemented internationally, he states. The Financial Action Task Force only recently hammered out a basic agreement on how best to implement sanctions against terrorist groups, he writes. Terrorist finance is intricately interwoven with the larger war on terror, he notes, and it must be integrated into overall counterterrorism strategies. [ES;LCJ]

AA05092 AND THE WALLS CAME TUMBLING DOWN

Muravchik, Joshua

American Enterprise Vol. 26, No. 3, April-May 2005, pp. 32-34, 28

Summary: Muravchik, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, describes the worldwide movement towards democracy and particularly recent changes in the Middle East. Experts wrongly advised that democracy couldn't work in Japan in the post-World War II era. Muravchik argues that the Middle East will not remain a bastion of autocracy, and that there are positive signs from diverse groups that there is a movement toward democracy. He calls 2005 "the year of Arab election" and says that democracy is arriving in unexpected spurts. [DHR;ANG]

AA05090 THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICA'S SOFT POWER**Gardels, Nathan****New Perspectives Quarterly Vol. 22, No. 1, Winter, 2005, pp. 6-19**

Summary: Gardels, editor of the New Perspectives Quarterly, describes a new paradigm, a world with porous borders where power is associated with economic prowess and the sway of hearts and minds rather than military might. He contends that American ideas of personal freedom, equality under the rule of law, and social and economic opportunity -- soft power -- was a legitimizing complement to US military might and helped undermine the hard power of the Soviet empire. Gardels describes the unease felt in the Muslim world where prayer and faith are in collision with Western secular materialism. He also discusses how world public opinion of the US since the invasion of Iraq has had the profound strategic consequence of the loss of US soft power. [DHR;ANG]

AA05085 NEW APPROACHES TO DETERRENCE IN BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED STATES**Yost, David S.****International Affairs vol. 81, No. 1, January 2005, pp. 83-114**

Summary: Yost, a professor at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School and a former Senior Fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, provides an overview of the recent evolution of post-Cold War nuclear deterrence thinking in Britain, France, and the United States. Each nation has reduced their arsenal significantly in the last decade and made major changes to existing nuclear strategy, such as President Bush's Nuclear Posture Review in 2001, French President Jacques Chirac's speech in June 2001 and Britain's Strategic Defence Review of 1998 and 2002. These formulations recognize the need to readdress concerns about the viability of limited strikes, the role of missile defenses, and the newly emergent post-9/11 doctrines of pre-emption and preventive war, all in the backdrop of Alliance relations and as separate amendments or reiterations of existing national deterrence policies. [IS;JM]

AA05070 TERRORISM AND THE NEW SECURITY DILEMMA**Cerny, Philip G.****Naval War College Review Vol. 58, No. 1, Winter 2005, pp. 11-33**

Summary: States have always placed a premium on security; as the global security environment has changed over time, so have their security strategies. Cerny, professor of global political economy at Rutgers University, writes that the primary challenge of transnational terrorism to national governments is "how to deal with the increasingly diffuse character of threats with the means available to state actors, in what is still to a large extent an interstate system." Cerny notes that the terrorism threat represents "networks and patterns of violence that do not resemble the kind of 'international' warfare among states that has dominated the international system since the seventeenth century." He argues that terrorism is just one facet of a new phenomenon known as neomedievalism -- a "plurality of overlapping, competing and intersecting power structures ... above, below, and cutting across states and the states system." Cerny believes that instead of a "war on terror," what is needed is to "transform security itself -- pursuing a civilianization of politics and society, stressing social development ... and good governance." [IS;KS]

AA05061 THE CLASH BETWEEN SECURITY AND LIBERTY IN THE U.S. RESPONSE TO TERROR
Lewis, Carol W.**Public Administration Review Vol. 65, No. 1, January/February 2005, pp. 18-30**

Summary: Lewis, a professor of political science and public administration at the University of Connecticut, studied US public opinions on civil liberties and security in response to the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. Public opinion is a critical element in the political and administrative decision-making process. Lewis analyzes shifts in public attitudes and concludes that the public is not readily disposed to restrict civil liberties as the price of security. [DHR;ANG]

AA05071 INSIDE THE COMMITTEE THAT RUNS THE WORLD**Rothkopf, David****Foreign Policy No. 147, March/April 2005**

Summary: The National Security Council (NSC) -- the nucleus of the U.S. national security community -- is "probably the most powerful committee in the history of the world," writes Rothkopf, a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment. Rothkopf also notes that the Republican party, controlling both houses of Congress and the White House, thus controlling the NSC, has unprecedented power, yet the NSC's inner circle is being pulled in different directions from within. September 11 dramatically changed the atmosphere within the shadowy, little-understood NSC, pitting the "traditionalists", exemplified by Brent Scowcroft, national security advisor under George H.W. Bush, and the "transformationalists," led by Vice President Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. This tug-of-war characterized Condoleezza Rice's tenure as national security advisor; Rothkopf notes that Rice is in the center of the divide between the two factions. The NSC operates with unusual freedom -- none of the NSC staff are confirmed by the Senate, so it is not subject to Congressional oversight, and has become a "preserve for those activities that an administration wishes to conduct beyond congressional scrutiny." Rothkopf believes that the divisions that have emerged within the NSC give an indication of the direction that the White House will head in the next four years. This article is based on the author's book **RUNNING THE WORLD: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE ARCHITECTS OF AMERICAN POWER**, due to be published in May. [TEM;GWB]

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
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TODAY'S NUCLEAR EQUATION



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Cover: An adaptation of Albert Einstein's famous equation $E=mc^2$ in which the explosive energy (E) of a splitting atom is equal to the mass (m) of the atom times the speed of light squared (c^2). In *Today's Nuclear Equation*, illicit sellers of nuclear technology and materials (such as Pakistan's A.Q. Khan) finding buyers (represented by the masked terrorist) could wreak nuclear havoc.

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
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ABOUT THIS ISSUE



TODAY'S NUCLEAR EQUATION

Just when we thought that the end of the Cold War also meant the end of nighttime terrors about nuclear annihilation, that evil atomic specter, rising out of a terrible mushroom-shaped cloud, has reappeared. In the calculus of the Cold War, the world lived with the threat of two superpowers unleashing thousands of megatons of destructive power at each other – and thereby threatening the existence of the human race.

While that threat has receded, this edition of *Foreign Policy Agenda* examines the elements in today's nuclear equation. Instead of superpowers facing off, we encounter rogue states, stateless terrorist organizations bent on acquiring the means of mass murder, and black-market networks of renegade suppliers (like Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan pictured on the cover) willing to deal in the materials and technical expertise that lead to nuclear weapons. The ensuing nightmare could

materialize quite unexpectedly in any large city, wreaking death and destruction on thousands or tens of thousands of ordinary people going about their daily routine.

Since the end of the Cold War, the main barrier hemming in the nuclear nightmare has been the 35-year-old Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Under its terms, a review conference is held every five years to assess the status of nuclear proliferation dangers and nonproliferation progress. The next month-long review begins on May 2, 2005, in New York City.

This electronic journal, "Today's Nuclear Equation," is published in advance of the conference to offer the U.S. position on critical treaty-related issues as well as a range of expert opinion on the thorniest current issues in nuclear nonproliferation.

The Editors



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U.S. FIRMLY COMMITTED TO NPT

GEORGE W. BUSH



In a statement issued March 7, 2005, President George W. Bush reaffirmed America's commitment to carry out its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The president urged NPT members to "close the loopholes that allow states to produce nuclear materials that can be used to build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs."

Thirty-five years ago, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons entered into force. Today, almost all nations are party to the Treaty. The NPT represents a key legal barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation and makes a critical contribution to international security.

In May, the parties to the NPT will convene the Seventh Review Conference of the treaty. In the context of this review, I reaffirm the determination of the United States to carry out its treaty commitments and to work to ensure its continuance in the interest of world peace and security.

NPT Parties must take strong action to confront the threat of noncompliance with the NPT in order to preserve and strengthen the treaty's nonproliferation undertakings. We cannot allow rogue states that violate their commitments and defy the international community to undermine the NPT's fundamental role in strengthening international security. We must therefore close the loopholes that allow states to produce nuclear materials that can be used to build bombs under the cover of civilian nuclear programs.

For international norms to be effective, they must be enforced. It is the charge of the International Atomic Energy Agency to uncover banned nuclear activity and to

report these violations. The IAEA safeguards system is therefore an important means of detecting and preventing NPT violations. The IAEA must have the tools it needs to do its work, especially universal adherence to the Additional Protocol.

The United States remains firmly committed to its obligations under the NPT. Our record demonstrates this commitment, including the Moscow Treaty concluded in 2002. The United States will continue to play a leading role in strengthening the nonproliferation regime. We have undertaken concrete actions and made several proposals to strengthen the NPT, the IAEA, and the broader nonproliferation regime, including launching the Proliferation Security Initiative.

It is essential in these times of great challenge to international security, particularly when rogue states and terrorists seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction, that the international community work together to confront the dangers of nuclear proliferation. I call upon all states that are party to the treaty to act promptly and effectively to meet the challenges to the NPT and our common security. By doing so, we can ensure that it remains an effective instrument of global security. ■

CONTROLLING THE WORLD'S MOST DANGEROUS WEAPON

STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER

Members of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty “cannot stand by and allow North Korea and Iran to... arm themselves with nuclear weapons,” says Stephen Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, in this lead-off article. NPT signatories, Rademaker asserts, must insist that the two regimes “abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions and return to compliance with the NPT.” Prior to joining the State Department, he was Chief Counsel to the Select Committee on Homeland Security of the U.S. House of Representatives.

A new world emerged on September 11, 2001—a world more uncertain and dangerous than the one we knew before. In countries around the world, innocents are the target of a new type of war. Terrorists, including al-Qaida, are trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Terrorists demonstrated their willingness to use these devastating weapons even before September 11th with the use of poison gas in Tokyo’s subway. These weapons have become the terrorists’ weapons of choice precisely because they seek to destroy innocent life on an indiscriminate, mass scale. The greatest threat before humanity today is the nexus of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction proliferation.

Rogue states, with close ties to terrorist organizations, also seek to acquire these destructive weapons. North Korea has defied the world, expelled international inspectors, announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and recently claimed to possess nuclear weapons. Iran hid its NPT violations from the world for nearly two decades in an effort to master the technology necessary to build nuclear weapons. It refuses to abandon this effort despite strong international opprobrium.

We cannot stand by and allow North Korea and Iran to flout their obligations, arm themselves with nuclear weap-

ons, and threaten the peace and stability of their regions and the world. Equally troubling is the prospect that they may transfer sensitive nuclear technology or weapons to other rogue states or terrorist organizations.

We know that unscrupulous black marketeers seek to supply the lucrative demand for weapons of mass destruction. They are at work in more countries than we previously suspected. The A.Q. Khan supply network is now known to have manufactured and moved dangerous materials through unsuspecting countries that never would have knowingly allowed this. A sophisticated, clandestine operation such as this increases the probability that terrorists might obtain the weapons they desire most. While we are learning more every day, there is still much to be done to unravel the Khan network and prevent other clandestine proliferation networks from forming or continuing to operate.

Threats of global proportion require a global response. President Bush made this core principle clear in the National Security Strategy of the United States, indicating that we are “guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations.”

These challenges demand our full attention and action now. We must support and uphold the system of international rules and treaties that keep us safe and secure. This requires a commitment to enforce those rules—to show that there are serious consequences for violations. It also requires that all responsible nations must strengthen their laws and controls to prevent proliferation, including securing and controlling their ports and borders. This is our shared responsibility, for none of us wants inadvertently to help terrorists obtain the terrible weapons they seek.

We must remain united in insisting that Iran and North Korea abandon their nuclear weapons ambitions and return to compliance with the NPT. Libya provided a positive model. In December 2003, Libya admitted to



Signing ceremony. Negotiations on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were completed in 1968. In this photo from July 1 of that year, U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn E. Thompson, left, signs the treaty in Moscow with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko. Among U.S. embassy and Soviet government officials witnessing the ceremony is Soviet Premier Alexei N. Kosygin, standing third from right. (AP Wide World Photos)

having sought nuclear weapons and violating the NPT, but made the strategic choice to renounce weapons of mass destruction. This demonstrates that it is possible for states to abandon the pursuit of illegal weapons, enhance their national security and rejoin the international community.

New and serious proliferation threats require new tools and a willingness to improve and creatively adapt the nonproliferation regime that helps protect us all. The Proliferation Security Initiative is one such new arrangement. It promotes cooperation among states to interdict illicit weapons and materials before they reach their intended destinations. This is one of the major successes in the global effort to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

NPT parties have an important opportunity to strengthen the treaty at a month-long Review Conference in May 2005. This is the seventh such conference since the NPT entered into force in 1970. Never before have the members of the treaty faced the scope of violations that occurred in recent years. In a separate article, Amba-

sador Jackie Sanders, Special Representative of the President for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, will highlight U.S. goals for the Review Conference. Much work is already under way in many fora to address the new threats to nuclear nonproliferation, and the Review Conference can provide important political affirmation and momentum to this work. We must cooperate closely to preserve the role of the NPT in promoting international peace and security in the decades ahead.

Throughout the 20th century, the international community was repeatedly called upon to meet and overcome fundamental threats to peace and security. We prevailed. In this new century, let us rise to the challenge of our time: preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and thwarting terrorists' deadly aims. If we work together, I have no doubt that we, in our time, shall also prevail. Through constructive collaboration and determination we can keep our citizens safe and build a more secure future for our children. ■

HOW TO STRENGTHEN THE NPT

JACKIE WOLCOTT SANDERS

In order to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), we must deal with today's reality. NPT parties must maintain pressure on existing violators and strengthen efforts to deter future noncompliance, according to Ambassador Jackie Wolcott Sanders, U.S. Representative to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the Special Representative of the President for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. She summarizes here six specific actions that NPT parties could take to reinforce the treaty's nonproliferation obligations.

Countries that are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) will gather in New York City in May 2005 for the 1970 treaty's Seventh Review Conference. A key barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation, the NPT has made a critical contribution to peace and security.

The NPT provides a collective security framework in which nearly 190 countries undertake reciprocal nonproliferation commitments to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It requires the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards to help ensure that nuclear programs for peaceful purposes are not being diverted to other uses. IAEA safeguards are applied to nearly 900 facilities in 64 NPT member countries.

The treaty also provides for NPT parties to pursue peaceful nuclear programs, but mandates that their nuclear activities must comply with the treaty's nonproliferation obligations. The treaty has facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation among NPT parties, ranging from billion-dollar reactors that generate electricity to expanding the use of nuclear medicine in developing countries.

All parties to the treaty are obligated to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures related to cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

TODAY'S THREAT

The NPT has delivered considerable benefits to its parties over the 35 years it has been in force. Noncompliance with the treaty's nonproliferation obligations, however, poses a grave challenge to its continued viability. While some violations began 20 years ago, the extent of this noncompliance came to light only in the years since the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

Noncompliance undermines the security benefits of the NPT. Other benefits such as the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and progress on disarmament will not be fully realized over the long run if strong action is not taken to confront this threat.

North Korea was first cited by the IAEA for noncompliance in 1993. When confronted with new violations in 2002, North Korea expelled international inspectors and announced its intention to withdraw from the treaty.

In 2002 the world also learned more about the Iranian regime's long pursuit of a secret nuclear weapons program, even as it claimed to be engaged solely in peaceful nuclear activity. Despite seven IAEA resolutions urging compliance with its obligations, the government of Iran continues to cover up its violations, to avoid full disclosure, and to insist on retention of capabilities obtained through violation of the treaty.

On a positive note, Libya abandoned its nuclear weapons program, and Iraq is returning to compliance with the NPT. The international community also recently discovered the global reach of A.Q. Khan's illicit nuclear procurement network.

This is today's NPT reality, one that is far different from that which its parties have faced in the past. Responsible governments cannot allow states to violate their NPT commitments and defy the international community. NPT members must maintain pressure on existing violators and strengthen efforts to deter future noncompliance. The loopholes that allow states to produce nuclear material for bombs under the cover of a civilian nuclear program must be eliminated. President Bush recently



Landmark agreement. President Vladimir Putin, left and President George W. Bush shake hands May 24, 2002, as they exchange signed documents committing Russia and the United States to the largest reductions ever in their nuclear arsenals. (Alexander Zemlianichenko, AP Wide World Photos.)

reaffirmed the determination of the United States to carry out its NPT commitments and to work to assure the treaty's continuance in the interest of world peace and security.

NONPROLIFERATION AND NONCOMPLIANCE

At the Review Conference, the United States will seek a broader understanding from member states of the nonproliferation obligations of Articles I, II and III and of their relationship to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy noted in Article IV. We will discuss actions that NPT parties should take to implement these obligations and describe activities that send a warning signal of possible noncompliance with these undertakings.

The United States believes, for example, that nuclear-weapon states should establish and implement effective export controls in order to ensure rigorous compliance with their Article I obligation not "in any way" to assist any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture nuclear weapons. They should cut off nuclear assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon state in violation of its NPT nonproliferation obligations and seek a halt in the use of any

previously supplied nuclear items. Supplier states should also reserve the right to require the return of such items or their elimination.

Non-nuclear-weapon states should have the necessary laws and regulations to enforce their Article II undertaking not to acquire nuclear weapons and should provide transparency sufficient to demonstrate their peaceful intent. Effective enforcement of Article II also requires a close examination of what constitutes a violation. It makes no sense to wait until a non-nuclear-weapon state has secretly assembled a nuclear weapon before taking action. Facts indicating that the purpose of a particular activity was the acquisition of a nuclear explosive device would tend to show noncompliance. Examples of such facts include clandestine facilities or procurement, willful IAEA safeguards violations, and a nuclear program with no legitimate justification for peaceful purposes. NPT parties must rigorously comply with their IAEA safeguards obligations (Article III) and cooperate fully and promptly with the IAEA in the event of investigations into possible noncompliance.

Efforts are underway in international fora and among like-minded states to convince Iran and North Korea to make the strategic decision to eliminate their nuclear weapon programs. All NPT parties must continue to hold both states accountable.

The United States has responded to these new threats by taking concrete actions to strengthen the NPT, the IAEA, and the broader nonproliferation regime. We would urge the Review Conference to endorse measures such as the following

- adoption of policies to discourage future noncompliance, including a cutoff of nuclear cooperation
- enactment of effective controls to ensure compliance with NPT nonproliferation obligations and to keep territories free of illicit activities, such as those of the Khan network
- implementation of the provisions of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540 (which requires states to enact and enforce legal and regulatory measures to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials)
- strengthen export controls on enrichment and reprocessing technology
- cooperation to interdict illegal transfers of nuclear mate-

rial and equipment that is fully consistent with domestic legal authorities and international law and relevant frameworks, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative

- universal acceptance of comprehensive NPT safeguards agreements along with the Additional Protocol (which expands the ability of the IAEA to inspect and monitor nuclear-related activities), and the adoption of that safeguard standard as a condition of nuclear supply

PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

The Review Conference should further encourage cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy among compliant NPT parties. This cooperation is an important treaty benefit. The United States pursues peaceful nuclear cooperation with up to 100 NPT parties—bilaterally, multilaterally and through the IAEA.

The United States maintains 22 agreements that permit the export of reactors and fuel to 40 NPT countries and a separate agreement for similar cooperation through the IAEA. In 2004, we provided over \$20 million to fund the IAEA's Technical Cooperation Program and related IAEA projects. These IAEA activities assist member states through nuclear applications in fields such as medicine, agriculture, and water management.

The United States also will emphasize the clear linkages established in Article IV between peaceful uses of nuclear energy and compliance with the NPT's nonproliferation obligations, and the parameters for nuclear cooperation spelled out in that article. Some NPT parties have used the treaty as a façade to develop and acquire assistance for an allegedly peaceful nuclear program while pursuing nuclear weapon capabilities.

An NPT party's nuclear program must comply with the treaty. Sound NPT implementation and enforcement should entail reducing violators' access to nuclear technology. NPT parties should seek to halt the use of nuclear material acquired or produced as a result of a material violation of the NPT's nonproliferation obligations. These items should be eliminated or returned to the original supplier.

The plain language of Article IV creates no "right" to any particular nuclear activities or facilities, nor does it require the transfer of any particular technology. Indeed, nuclear suppliers should not approve a transfer unless they are fully satisfied that it would not contribute to proliferation. Moreover, noncompliant states have no basis for asserting that Article IV provides them immunity from actions taken against their nuclear program.

DISARMAMENT

The Review Conference can strengthen the NPT's disarmament undertakings by honestly appraising the current status of implementation and considering how best to move forward. The United States remains firmly committed to its Article VI obligations. We are proud of our record of reducing nuclear forces.

At the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in 1991, the United States and Russia each had deployed around 10,000 strategic nuclear warheads. Both reduced this level to 6,000 by December 2001. U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear warheads will be reduced further to 1,700-2,200 by 2012, as stated by Presidents Bush and Putin and codified in the 2003 Moscow Treaty. In total, this represents an 80% reduction from the early 1990s.

The overall United States nuclear stockpile is shrinking at the same time that its operationally deployed weapons are being reduced. In May 2004, President Bush approved a plan that will cut the current stockpile almost in half. By 2012, the U.S. stockpile will be the smallest it has been in several decades.

The United States continues to eliminate launchers and delivery vehicles. Since 1997, we have eliminated 64 heavy bombers and 150 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, converted four ballistic missile submarines to other uses, and deactivated or retired 37 of the 50 ICBM Peacekeepers. These systems are not being replaced.

The United States has made even more dramatic reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW). We have reduced the U.S. NSNW stockpile by over 90% since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In 2004, we dismantled the last of the 3,000-plus warheads that President George H.W. Bush in 1991 ordered eliminated.

The United States does not produce fissile material for nuclear weapons and has removed more than 200 tons of such material from its military stockpile, placing some of it under IAEA safeguards and converting approximately 60 tons to civilian reactor fuel.

When discussing the critical importance of compliance with the nonproliferation provisions of the NPT, it is sometimes asserted that this is a way for the United States to avoid discussion of compliance with Article VI. The United States has not de-emphasized Article VI, and promotion of nonproliferation does not denigrate disarmament, nor does addressing very real threats to all Parties' security. Besides, pressing on the nonproliferation front is also critical for the NPT's long-term disarmament goals.

Even though most understand the risk posed by

violations of the NPT's nonproliferation provisions on an intellectual basis, some choose to react in a less than productive way. It is self-defeating to suggest, as some do, that support for efforts to strengthen the treaty against proliferation should be withheld because of concerns about implementation of Article VI.

The idea of pitting various articles of the treaty against one another is simply wrong. Compliance with all articles of the treaty is essential if the NPT is to meet all of its goals.

U.S. actions over the past 15 years have established an excellent record of meeting our Article VI obligations in a transparent manner. As we have done throughout the preparatory process, the United States will demonstrate its commitment to Article VI at the Review Conference. [Editor's note: For more on U.S. Article VI implementation, use this link: <http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/42126.htm>]

UNIVERSALITY

The Review Conference should reinforce the goal of universal NPT adherence and reaffirm that India, Israel and Pakistan may join the NPT only as non-nuclear-weapon states. Just as South Africa and Ukraine did in the early 1990s, these states would have to forswear nuclear weapons and accept IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities to join the treaty. At the same time, we recognize that progress toward universal adherence is not likely

in the foreseeable future. The United States continues to support the goals of the Middle East resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, including the achievement of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction.

CONCLUSION

The 2005 NPT Review Conference will provide an opportunity for the international community to determine how best to strengthen the treaty to face the challenges that have come to light since it was reviewed five years ago. President Bush called for cooperation in this endeavor in his March 7, 2005, statement marking the 35th anniversary of the NPT:

"It is essential in these times of great challenge to international security, particularly when rogue states and terrorists seek to acquire weapons of mass destruction, that the international community work together to confront the dangers of nuclear proliferation."

In order to meet the challenges to the NPT and our common security, we must act urgently together to ensure that this important treaty remains an effective instrument of global security. The United States is committed to doing its part. ■

TAKING LEGISLATIVE AIM AT WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

RICHARD G. LUGAR



The world is awash with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and material, says U.S. Senator Richard Lugar, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. He is the author of three laws which initiated and then expanded U.S. efforts to help the former Soviet Union “safeguard and dismantle its enormous stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as its means of delivery and related materials.” But more must be done, he asserts, “to control threats from biological and chemical weapons” around the world and to address numerous remaining nuclear proliferation issues—among them, Russian short-range tactical weapons, stockpiles of spent reactor fuel, the absence of nuclear agreements with India and Pakistan, and the need for U.S. and European companies to provide “sustainable private sector jobs” for scientists who otherwise may be “tempted to find work helping others acquire dangerous weapons.”

Senator Lugar, a Republican, was first elected to the U.S. Senate from the state of Indiana in 1976 and is the longest-serving U.S. senator in the state’s history.

Photo above: An excavator with giant scissors attached cuts off the nose of a Tu-160 strategic bomber at a Ukraine airbase some 200 miles from the capital Kiev, February 2, 2001. Elimination of the last Tu-160 was carried out under terms of the U.S.-Ukrainian Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. (Efrem Lukatsky, AP Wide World Photos)

At their recent summit in Bratislava, President Bush and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin agreed to conclude cooperative security enhancements at Russia’s nuclear warhead- and material-storage facilities by no later than the year 2008. This new, accelerated deadline is a welcome development that underscores the importance of stopping proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the proliferation of WMD has been the top national security challenge facing the United States. Unfortunately, few people have recognized this fact. During the 1990s, the nuclear terrorist threat barely registered in surveys of public opinion and, as recently as the 2000 presidential election, neither political party’s candidate had clearly stated positions on nuclear terrorism or nonproliferation strategies.

In the face of widespread apathy, the Nunn-Lugar Act, which I co-sponsored with then-Senator Sam Nunn in 1991, has required constant vigilance to obtain funding and support for its work in securing Soviet-era nuclear materials.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent revelations about global terrorism changed all that. During the 2004 presidential campaign, President Bush and his main challenger, Senator John Kerry, delivered major speeches on counterproliferation. In their debates, they agreed that our greatest national security threat was weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands

of terrorists. The report of the 9/11 Commission, an independent panel that examined the September 11 attacks, noted that “preventing the proliferation of [weapons of mass destruction] warrants a maximum effort” and that “Nunn-Lugar ... is now in need of expansion, improvement, and resources.”

A FOURTH INSTALLMENT

Earlier this year, to do just that, I introduced the fourth installment of Nunn-Lugar legislation in Congress. The original initiative, officially named the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, took effect in 1993 and provided U.S. funding and expertise to help the former Soviet Union safeguard and dismantle its enormous stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, as well as its means of delivery and related materials. In 1997, Senator Nunn and I, along with Senator Pete Domenici of New Mexico, introduced the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, which expanded Nunn-Lugar’s scope in the former Soviet Union and provided WMD expertise to first responders in American cities.

In 2003, President Bush signed the Nunn-Lugar Expansion Act, which authorized Nunn-Lugar to operate outside the former Soviet Union. My new bill will provide more flexibility to pursue Nunn-Lugar projects outside the former Soviet Union, and it will eliminate congressionally imposed conditions on legislation that have impeded time-sensitive projects. We need to cut the red tape and friction within the U.S. government that hinder speedy responses to nonproliferation opportunities.

Despite these achievements and the success at Bratislava, there is much more to do. The world is awash with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and

materials. Fortunately, the Bush administration is moving on several fronts. In the area of cooperative threat reduction, the president’s fiscal year (FY) 2006 budget proposal seeks \$415.5 million for Nunn-Lugar, an increase from FY 2005 and enough to carry out all scheduled activities.

Soon after the budget request was released in February 2005, Presidents Bush and Putin announced important steps to increase cooperative efforts to enhance the security of Russia’s nuclear stockpile against terrorists. This progress further underscores the need for expanding the Nunn-Lugar program and eliminating the congressionally imposed conditions and certifications that have consistently slowed down implementation of its efforts.

SEIZE THE OPPORTUNITY

Even as recent international attention has been focused on the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran, we need to seize this opportunity to control threats from biological and chemical weapons and to make major breakthroughs in the following areas of nuclear proliferation:

- Bring Russian short-range tactical nuclear weapons into the Nunn-Lugar program. For all the success we have had in deactivating Russian intercontinental missiles and strategic warheads, Moscow has so far refused to discuss tactical weapons, which may be even more dangerous.

AN IMPRESSIVE RECORD

Despite obstacles, Nunn-Lugar has made a considerable contribution to nonproliferation. To date, the program has deactivated or destroyed

- 6,564 nuclear warheads
- 568 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
- 477 ICBM silos
- 17 ICBM mobile missile launchers
- 142 bombers
- 761 nuclear surface-to-air missiles
- 420 submarine missile launchers
- 543 submarine-launched missiles
- 28 nuclear submarines
- 194 nuclear test tunnels

In addition

- 260 tons of fissile material have received either comprehensive or rapid security upgrades
- some 60 nuclear warhead sites have received security upgrades
- 208 metric tons of highly enriched uranium have been blended down to low-enriched uranium
- the International Science and Technology Centers in Russia and Ukraine, of which the United States is the leading sponsor, have engaged 58,000 former weapons scientists in peaceful work
- the International Proliferation Prevention Program has funded 750 projects involving 14,000 former weapons scientists and created some 580 new peaceful high-tech jobs
- Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are nuclear weapons-free as a result of cooperative efforts under Nunn-Lugar

- Control nuclear materials worldwide. Large amounts of weapons-grade material outside the former Soviet Union pose a threat to international security. We should accelerate the current international programs to



Standing in a cornfield near Holden, Missouri, on October 28, 1995, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry, left, and Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev watch a cloud of smoke rise after they pushed a detonation button setting off an implosion that destroyed an underground Minuteman I I missile silo. The event symbolized the ending of the Cold War: (Cliff Schiappa, AP Wide World Photos)



An explosion of 100 tons of TNT seals the final remaining tunnel of a Soviet-era nuclear testing facility in Semipalatinsk, Kazakhstan, July 29, 2002. In the foreground, Kazak and American flags fly from a satellite communications tower. The explosion marked the end of the nuclear era in Kazakhstan. (Michael Rothbart, AP Wide World Photos)

eliminate stockpiles of spent reactor fuel and to convert research reactors to low-enriched uranium.

- Win nuclear agreements with India and Pakistan. The United States should devote sustained efforts to promote confidence-building measures and support the encouraging steps these two nuclear-armed foes have already made, while taking care to adhere to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations.

- Eliminate U.S. and Russian bureaucratic roadblocks to cooperatively securing vulnerable fissile materials and warhead sites. If the two sides are to meet their Bratislava commitments, Russia will have to stop denying access to sites and refusing to provide tax-free status on contributions from participating countries, and it will have to conclude liability protections for G-8 partners.

- Get more U.S. and European companies to hire weapons scientists. The tens of thousands of scientists we have employed are mostly working at government-sponsored or government-subsidized jobs. We must move many more of these men and women into sustainable private sector jobs so they are not tempted to find work helping others acquire dangerous weapons.

- Secure Russian ratification of the Nunn-Lugar umbrella agreement. This agreement, which underpins all U.S. threat reduction work in the former Soviet Union, needs to be formally extended, but President Putin has so far refused to present it to the Duma for a vote. Without its guarantees, which prevent weapons clean-up contributions from being taxed by Russian authorities and protect U.S. contractors from liability while undertaking this risky endeavor, work could come to a halt.

- Finalize a plutonium disposition agreement. At the Bratislava summit, issues of liability continued to stymie efforts to destroy 34 metric tons of Russian plutonium, despite a fresh U.S. push to resolve the matter.

- Increase the pace of activities under the G-8 Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction created in 2002. The United States is living up to its agreement to provide \$10 billion over 10 years for weapons clean-up, but our partners in this community of major industrial democracies are still working to meet

their equivalent pledge. More importantly, we need to concentrate on turning pledges into projects.

The window of opportunity to address these threats will not remain open indefinitely. Our political leadership and nonproliferation experts must act now to follow up on the recent summit and work with Russian authorities to unlock the last doors to the dismantlement of its nuclear weapons program. I hope Congress will do its

part by passing the new Nunn-Lugar bill to eliminate potential obstacles to the Bratislava timetables. Further, we should scour the globe to identify and create opportunities to dismantle dangerous programs outside the former Soviet Union. Only by working night and day to find and eliminate weapons of mass destruction can we fulfill our obligations to protect the American people and, indeed, the people of all nations. ■

NUCLEAR TERRORISM

Weapons for Sale or Theft?

GAVIN CAMERON

The theft of a tactical nuclear weapon or the purchase of weapons-grade nuclear material by terrorists is a 21st-century nightmare that may well come true, says Dr. Gavin Cameron. An assistant professor of political science at the University of Calgary, Canada, Cameron is the author of Nuclear Terrorism: A Threat Assessment for the 21st Century (2001) and has written numerous articles on the threats posed by the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction. In this article he takes readers through four distinct nuclear terrorist scenarios: stealing an intact nuclear weapon; stealing or buying weapons-grade fissile material; attacking a nuclear site in order to cause a contamination incident; and using radioactive material to make a "dirty bomb."

Although nuclear terrorism has been a source of speculation and concern from the mid-1970s onward, the end of the Cold War heralded additional fears about the ability of sub-state actors to acquire weapons of mass destruction. At one time experts argued that terrorists wouldn't try to maximize casualties, employing violence instead as a means of coercing concessions from governments. Top terrorism analyst Brian Jenkins, of the RAND think tank, once observed of 1970s-era terrorist objectives: "Terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead."

Since 9/11, the "rules" have changed, and few experts would suggest that there are not at least some terrorists who do want to inflict mass casualties. In that context, nuclear terrorism does not only represent an effort to intimidate and coerce, but also poses a critical threat to states and peoples around the world.

Nuclear terrorism incorporates four distinct types of terrorist activity:

- the theft and use of an intact nuclear device
- theft or other acquisition of fissile material which would then be used to make a nuclear weapon
- attacks on reactors or other nuclear facilities with the goal of causing radiological contamination of surrounding areas
- the use of radiological material to make a radiological dispersal device (RDD)

Of these, the RDD, or "dirty bomb," is the easiest to achieve and thus most likely to occur, but the theft of an intact nuclear device or of the fissile material with which to make a nuclear device represent the deadliest risks.

THE THEFT OF AN INTACT NUCLEAR DEVICE

Roughly 30,000 nuclear weapons exist worldwide. Several hundred weapons are vulnerable to theft by terrorists or criminals who might sell them to terrorist organizations. It is clear that some such groups are interested in acquiring a nuclear device: Aum Shinrikyo and al-Qaida have both actively sought to purchase a weapon.

It seems improbable that a state would deliberately provide a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group. Fear of retribution from the attacked state and international community, potential loss of control over the nuclear-armed terrorist group, and a reluctance to surrender nuclear weapons to another party due to the intrinsic difficulty of acquiring them all mitigate against such state sponsorship. Nevertheless, North Korea's February 2005 announcements that it possesses nuclear weapons



Rescue workers and medical personnel attend to subway passengers in Tokyo affected by a sarin gas attack, March 20, 1995. Aum Shinrikyo, the terrorist group that carried out the attack that killed 12 persons and injured thousands, has sought to acquire nuclear material that could be used to build weapons. (Chikumo Chiaki, AP Wide World Photos)

and intends to build more underscore particular concerns in this context, given that state's history of selling missile technology to other states. More likely than state sponsorship, however, is the possibility that military or scientific elites in some states might be willing, for ideological or financial reasons, to provide nuclear weapons, materiel, or expertise to terrorist organizations.

Still, the United States and Russia maintain the world's largest nuclear stockpiles. While many nuclear weapons in Russia are adequately protected from theft, others are not. Many Soviet-era tactical nuclear devices are especially vulnerable, and given the smaller size of such weapons, would be particularly suitable for use by terrorists.

THE THEFT OF FISSILE MATERIAL TO BUILD A NUCLEAR DEVICE

Obtaining fissile material represents the second, and more probable, route to the possession by terrorists of a nuclear device. It is this acquisition of material that

represents the chief barrier to such a weapon. Nuclear devices with military-level efficiency may go beyond the capability of most terrorist organizations. The U.S.-led War on Terror has meant that few states are likely to grant terrorist organizations the time, space, resources and expertise necessary for such a sophisticated device. Therefore, the more likely scenario would be terrorist construction of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND). This would be less sophisticated than a military-level weapon but could be highly effective in causing mass casualties. An IND also would not require knowledge beyond that which is already available in the open literature. It assumes that the most likely device is the relatively simpler gun-type weapon, using uranium (U-235), rather than a more complex implosion weapon that requires plutonium (Pu-239). Such a gun-type device does, however, require large quantities (approximately 50 kg) of highly enriched uranium (HEU). Without state assistance, it is unlikely that even the most sophisticated terrorist organization could enrich nuclear materials in the

volume needed for a full-scale weapon. Therefore, the primary risk comes from the terrorist acquisition, whether through sale or theft, of state-produced fissile material.

As with intact nuclear devices, nuclear materials have been the target of several groups, most notably al-Qaida and Aum Shinrikyo. Both sought to acquire weaponizable material from the states of the former Soviet Union in the 1990s, although Aum Shinrikyo also tried and failed to enrich natural uranium. In spite of the difficulties both experienced in their acquisition efforts, the risk of terrorists gaining access to nuclear material remains considerable.

The amount of existing nuclear material scattered around the world in military and civilian sectors is enormous. Harvard University's Graham Allison says there is sufficient plutonium and highly enriched uranium to produce 240,000 nuclear weapons. Of course, security practices vary. In many states, such material is adequately protected, controlled, and accounted for, but elsewhere security measures are much looser.

Consequently, there have been regular reports of the embezzlement, theft, or smuggling of nuclear materials from facilities. In this respect, the Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union represent a particular concern, largely due to the quantities of material present there; but similar reports have emanated from states around the world. So far, the majority of incidents have involved small quantities of weapons-grade material, or larger quantities of non-weapons-grade nuclear material. The risk, however, is clearly present. Moreover, given that accounting standards are not universally high in all states, it is far from clear whether authorities would know in all cases if a significant quantity of weapons-grade material, sufficient to construct a nuclear device, were to go missing.

ATTACKS ON REACTORS OR OTHER NUCLEAR FACILITIES

Reactors and other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle—such as enrichment, storage, or spent-fuel reprocessing facilities—are vulnerable to attack by terrorists, and offer the potential to cause significant radiological contamination in the vicinity. Theoretical scenarios include not only suicidal airplane or truck-bomb attacks to cause dispersal of nuclear materials from the facilities via an explosion, but also the possibility of a group with knowledge of the design of a facility causing a leak by compromising a facility's safety systems, such as those relating to cooling and containment. Nuclear facilities

have been regularly threatened by terrorist groups with a range of motivations. Traditionally, single-issue, anti-nuclear groups have formed a significant part of this trend, although politically motivated groups, such as the separatists of ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty], have also attacked facilities. ETA targeted facilities before they went "on-line," and anti-nuclear or environmental groups are unlikely to cause precisely the type of incident that they most fear. However, more worrying has been the regular threats made against Russian facilities by Chechen separatists. The planners for the 9/11 attack also considered targeting a U.S. nuclear facility, although they ultimately rejected the idea.

RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES —"DIRTY BOMBS"

Even low-grade nuclear material would have value as part of a dirty bomb. Materials in this category are readily available within a wide range of applications in both the civilian and military sectors (cesium-137, for example, is commonly used in hospitals for x-rays). Such low-grade nuclear materials, or radioactive sources, are used widely, are far less protected than weapons-grade material, and are consequently vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist groups. This availability makes a radiological dispersal device (RDD) the most accessible type of nuclear weapon for terrorism, since such a device need only be a radiological source placed next to a conventional explosive. The most notable terrorist use of radiological material was in 1995, when Chechen separatists left a case of cesium in a Moscow park as a demonstration of capability.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

The priority for all states must be accurately to account for and safeguard nuclear weapons and weapons-grade nuclear material. Strengthening the protection of nuclear facilities, such as reactors, against attack and safeguarding low-grade nuclear materials is also a key priority. Actively supporting the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) "Action Plan for the Safety and Security of Radiation Sources" would certainly be helpful. Beyond accounting, however, there is a limit to the ability of states to protect fully all radioactive material within each's territory. Providing assistance to states to reinforce reactors and other facilities against terrorist attack would also help counter the potential for catastrophic incidents, but it can only be a partial solution.

States should focus primarily on preventing a terrorist from gaining access to or using a nuclear device because of the devastating effects of an explosion. Meaningful protection, control, and accounting, not only of all weapons but also of all weapons-grade nuclear material, is essential. It is clearly a vast undertaking, both financially and logistically. Securing international stockpiles of material is a priority for many states, and that must continue and be expanded. This necessitates not only one-time expenditures to secure such materials, but also ongoing commitments to ensure that storage facilities continue to be secure and, wherever possible, nuclear material and nuclear weapons are kept from terrorists or those who would provide them to terrorists.

Finally, it is essential to limit the growth of newly minted weapons and material from reaching market.

That links with the broader nonproliferation regime and necessitates promoting the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the work of the IAEA by encouraging disarmament and the destruction of existing stockpiles, along with campaigning for universal membership of the NPT. It also necessitates, in my view, promoting actively the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and the Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty.

The alternative is too grave to permit otherwise. ■

The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.

LIBYA RENOUNCES WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

PAULA A. DESUTTER



Libya's decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction programs is a real nonproliferation success story of the new millennium, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter says. Perhaps the single most telling example of the Libyan strategic change of heart is its decision to convert its notorious Rabta chemical weapons factory into a pharmaceuticals plant to combat infectious diseases.

DeSutter became assistant secretary of state in August 2002, after a series of senior positions in the former U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and then as a professional staff member of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. She is the author of Denial and Jeopardy: Detering Iranian Use of NBC Weapons.

Photo above: President Bush holds a centrifuge component from Libya being shown to him by Jon Kreykes, head of the national security advanced technology group at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. President Bush visited the laboratory July 12, 2004, to examine weapons parts turned over by Libya. (Susan Walsh, AP Wide World Photos)

Libya's public announcement on December 19, 2003, that it was abandoning its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long-range missile programs was viewed by many with not a little surprise. As the story unfolded, however, it became clear that Libya's historic announcement was an outgrowth of long-term international and U.S. pressure, including economic sanctions and travel restrictions, coupled with a demonstrated U.S. and U.K. ability to collect and act upon detailed intelligence about Libya's WMD and missile programs.

In March 2003, when the United States and its allies were demonstrating their commitment to reducing WMD threats around the world, Libya indicated an interest in discussing WMD issues, and quiet discussions began with British and U.S. officials. In October 2003, the U.S. and its allies interdicted a clandestine shipment of nuclear equipment on its way to Libya.

UNAMBIGUOUS U.S. EXPECTATIONS

The United States had been publicly raising concerns about Libyan WMD programs for many years. U.S. officials criticized Libya for its chemical weapons program in the 1980s, and at least as early as 1993 the



Among the nuclear weapons-related material that Libya permitted the United States to remove were these centrifuges acquired from Pakistan. (National Nuclear Security Administration)

United States warned publicly that Libya wished to acquire nuclear weapons and “may be attempting to lay the foundation for a more serious effort to produce them.” In 2003, after the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s government in Iraq by coalition forces, the United States continued its warnings about Libya. As Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton stated in his testimony before the House International Relations Committee on June 4, 2003, “We have long been concerned about Libya’s long-standing efforts to pursue nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and ballistic missiles.”

In that same testimony, Bolton set forth a way out for Libya, stating that “Libya must understand that improved relations with the United States means forgoing its WMD and missile programs.” During the course of 2003, the United States and United Kingdom in fact offered Libya the possibility of taking such a path. On December 19, 2003, President Bush clearly stated U.S. policy, observing that “leaders who abandon the pursuit of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them, will find an open path to better relations with the United States and other free nations.” Libya’s historic announcement earlier that day made clear that Libya had chosen to take this path.

Among the reasons for Libya’s historic decision was its understanding that pursuit of WMD and support for terrorism brought not security but insecurity. As Colonel

Muammar Qadhafi himself put it in a media interview in February 2004, Libya chose to declare its WMD program to the United States and the U.K. and seek their help in dismantling it “because it’s in our own interest and security.”

COMING CLEAN AND WMD-FREE

There was very little precedent for a country voluntarily eliminating all its WMD and long-range missile programs, but Libya’s clear strategic commitment to fulfilling its December 2003 pledge made this process a success. The sincerity of Libya’s strategic commitment was shown by its actions. Libya invited American and British experts to visit a wide range of sites and gave them access to key program personnel. Libya dismantled its nuclear weapons program, surrendered bomb designs illicitly procured from renegade Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan, and allowed its most advanced missiles, the Scud-Cs, to be removed promptly. Libya joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), destroyed thousands of unfilled chemical munitions under international supervision, and began the process of destroying its chemical weapons stockpile pursuant to CWC rules. Libya also committed itself to the staged elimination of its remaining long-range missile force of Scud-Bs.

Libyan cooperation was extremely good. Libyan officials answered questions with candor and volunteered information that provided valuable insight into the global proliferation network. During the course of this cooperative Libyan/U.S./U.K. elimination project, the Libyans demonstrated the good faith of their December 2003 commitment. They made themselves a model for the cooperative return of an isolated state to the broader international community through the verifiable elimination of illicit WMD and long-range missile programs. Libya’s clear strategic commitment to a new path also illustrated the centrality of demonstrable cooperation and good faith to verifying the fulfillment of such promises.

THE BENEFITS OF A SOUND DECISION

It is also important to recognize that Libya’s decision was not an easy one, and that providing the transparency shown by Libya required wisdom, discipline, and sincere commitment. Libya had previously believed its pursuit of WMD and missile programs was essential to its national security strategy, and it had invested large amounts of



Cameramen film the control room of Libya's Tajura Nuclear Reactor east of Tripoli, January 26, 2004. U.S. congressmen and journalists toured the 10-megawatt reactor site east of Tripoli where Libyan scientists had been doing research since 1983. (John Moore, AP Wide World Photos)

money in these programs for many years. It could not have been easy for Libya to decide to seek new ways to ensure its security. Likewise, it could not have been easy for Libya voluntarily to open up some of its most sensitive facilities to foreign experts. But Libya did all these things—and is more secure today for it.

The United States and the United Kingdom did not offer specific promises or rewards to Libya. We promised only that Libya's good faith, if shown, would be reciprocated—and that renouncing WMD would be a path to improved relations with the rest of the world. In effect, therefore, we held out the most attractive incentive available: the opportunity for Libya to reap the benefits that naturally flow from participating more fully in the community of nations.

Those benefits have turned out to be substantial. Libya has received many tangible benefits from better relations with the United States and the United Kingdom. The United States, for example, is no longer enforcing some of its most important sanctions against Libya, including travel restrictions and trade in oil and other important industries. Already, hundreds of millions of dollars in oil contracts have been made with private American firms. On the diplomatic front, the United States has opened a liaison office in Tripoli, and Libya has opened offices in Washington. Libya now participates in international meetings like those held by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and in connection with the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. It participates not as a

pariah nation, but as a genuine partner in the pursuit of the laudable goals of these organizations.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS PLANT WILL COMBAT HIV/AIDS, MALARIA

The United States and Britain have sent doctors and experts in biosafety and biosecurity matters to assist the Libyans in their efforts to modernize and redeploy their scientific and health care industries. In addition, we continue to assist in redirecting Libyan scientific efforts from WMD toward more productive activities with the full support of the international community. With Italian assistance—and thanks to an international diplomatic effort led by the United States to enact a technical change to the Verification Annex of the CWC—the Libyans are converting the infamous Rabta plant, under international supervision, from a chemical weapons factory to a pharmaceutical plant that will produce anti-malaria and anti-HIV/AIDS drugs for sub-Saharan Africa.

The United States government has used all of the tools at its disposal to change dramatically the cost-benefit calculations of rogue countries and proliferators around the world. We have penalized proliferators by aggressively imposing sanctions on them; we have coordinated with like-minded friends to improve our collective abilities to interdict WMD-related shipments; and we have shown ourselves more than willing to take dramatic action—even to the point of deposing a cruel dictator in Iraq who had previously used chemical weapons on his own people and would not hesitate to do so again if he had the capability. These new realities were recognized by Qadhafi who, explaining his dramatic decision to abandon his WMD programs, said in February 2004 “there are new realities. We are adapting to the new realities.” The United States and the international community have welcomed and applauded his decision, and the Libyan people are benefiting from the wisdom of this choice.

Libya's strategic commitment is a model, and presents a roadmap, for rogue countries that have been appropriately isolated by the international community due to their pursuit of WMD. The Libyan model shows a path out of this isolation achievable by making a genuine commitment to verifiably eliminating such dangerous weapons. ■

AFTER IRAN

Keeping Nuclear Energy Peaceful

HENRY SOKOLSKI



The best chance for nations seeking to prevent further nuclear proliferation is to enforce the original presumption of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty's Article IV, says author Henry Sokolski. Article IV presumes "against the unnecessary spread of unsafeguardable nuclear activities and materials." In the case of Iran, Sokolski writes that "Tehran's operation of an enrichment plant . . . should be regarded as being neither peaceful nor protected under Article IV of the NPT."

Sokolski is executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, a nonprofit educational organization in Washington, and is editor with Patrick Clawson of Getting Ready for a Nuclear-ready Iran (U.S. Army War College, Spring 2005).

Photo above: A Shahab 3 missile is put on parade in Tehran, September 21, 2000. The Shahab 3 is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead and has a 1,300-kilometer range. (Vahid Salemi, AP/Wide World photos)

Iran's claim that it has a "peaceful" right to acquire all it needs to come within days of having a bomb should remind us of what the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was meant to avoid. As the diplomat who first proposed the treaty, Irish Foreign Minister Fred Aiken, explained in 1959, a world of nuclear-ready states would resemble a town full of armed residents pointing guns at each other's heads. At some point, mutual suspicion and the advantage of firing first would give way to mayhem.

This was what the NPT was supposed to prevent. In 1965, the United Nations General Assembly resolved that the NPT was to be "void of loop-holes which might permit nuclear or non-nuclear power to proliferate, directly or indirectly, nuclear weapons in any form." As a result, the treaty's negotiators rejected proposals by Mexico and Spain to make the nuclear-weapon states' sharing of "the entire technology of reactors and fuels," including the means to produce nuclear weapons-usable materials, a "duty" under the NPT.

The treaty's negotiators understood that although nations should be free to develop "peaceful" nuclear energy under the NPT, whether or not a particular activity met

this criterion depended upon a number of factors. First, could the activity in question be safeguarded, as the NPT required, to prevent it from being diverted “from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons?” Could the NPT’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), monitor it in a manner that could reliably detect the loss or theft of enough nuclear material to make a bomb before this material could actually be fabricated into an explosive?

Meeting this timely detection criteria, which the IAEA has adopted to define its safeguard procedures, is still untenable at nuclear facilities that handle or can quickly produce large amounts of nuclear weapons-usable fuel. Such industrial units include plutonium separation plants, uranium-enrichment facilities, and factories that fabricate highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium-based fuels.

MISSING IN JAPAN, BRITAIN

Why are inspections at such plants insufficient to safeguard against such diversions? Consider Japan’s recent experience. In January of 2003, Japanese officials admitted that their pilot plutonium reprocessing plant at Tokaimura “lost” 206 kilograms of weapons-usable plutonium (roughly 40 crude bombs’ worth) over the previous 15 years. The Japanese hadn’t diverted the material; they simply were at loss as to where this material might have gone. One popular theory is that the material was “stuck in the pipes;” another theory is that it remains dissolved in chemical solution. These reported losses were in addition to the 70 kilograms of plutonium Japan previously conceded remained unaccounted for at a plutonium-based fuel fabrication plant it was operating. The British, meanwhile, have experienced similar losses at their plutonium reprocessing plant at Sellafield. There, 19 kilograms of separated plutonium went missing in 2003 and another 30 kilograms of separated plutonium went unaccounted for in 2004.

All of these plants operated under the watchful eye of the IAEA. This highlights two major safeguards deficiencies. First, with the unaccounted amounts of weapons-usable plutonium each year being many times what is needed to make a bomb, there is no way to be sure this material might not have already been diverted. Second, any nation operating such plants could at any time take any of the nuclear material they had produced (both accounted for and unaccounted for) and convert it into bombs well before any inspector or outside authority could step in to block the diversion.

With commercial uranium-enrichment facilities and highly enriched uranium fuel fabrication plants, which process tons of enriched uranium annually, equally hair-raising material loss scenarios are possible. For example, IAEA inspectors still cannot independently verify the production capacity of any given centrifuge-enrichment plant. As such, an enrichment plant operator could “lowball” his facility’s capacity to IAEA inspectors and, in between IAEA inspections visits, covertly produce and divert enriched uranium for military purposes without being detected. Such diversions, moreover, could take place without IAEA inspectors necessarily being tipped off.

Also (as with plutonium bulk-handling facilities), there is the problem of how quickly a non-nuclear weapons state could break out of its NPT obligations and make bombs with these plants. All of the facilities mentioned process materials that could be converted into bombs in days or weeks – well before any outside authority could intervene even if the diversion was detected.

With these activities, unless there is a compelling economic need to proceed, then, there are obvious security imperatives for holding back. Clearly falling into this category are the reprocessing of plutonium, the fabrication of plutonium and HEU-based fuels, and the production of HEU. All of these nuclear activities generate or handle nuclear weapons-usable materials, are not essential to having civilian nuclear power, and, in most cases, are sure-fire money losers.

A SURPLUS OF ENRICHMENT CAPACITY

As for lightly enriching natural uranium to contain 3 percent-to-5 percent uranium-235, this is required to fuel the world’s light water reactors. What’s unnecessary, however, is to expand the current surplus of enrichment capacity, which is more than able to supply world demand for at least the next 10-to-15 years. Given that it takes no more than five years to build substantial additional enrichment capacity, the time for any nation to build or invest in creating more net capacity is still at least 5-to-10 years away. That and concerns about the spread of this technology are why both President George W. Bush and IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei have proposed restricting the construction of new enrichment plants.

Certainly, there is no economic justification for nuclear novices like Iran to enrich uranium. Tehran only has one nuclear power station that requires lightly enriched uranium fuel, and Russia has promised to supply Iran with all the enriched uranium it needs for the entire lifetime of the reactor. Separate from the matter of Iran’s trustworthi-

ness (even after two years of intensive investigations, the IAEA has not yet been able to say whether Tehran is in the bomb-making business), Tehran's operation of an enrichment plant is neither safeguardable nor economically defensible. As such, this undertaking should be regarded as being neither peaceful nor protected under Article IV of the NPT.

Again, if Iran had a legal right to acquire such unnecessary, unsafeguardable nuclear facilities, what would keep Tehran's neighbors from following suit and becoming nuclear-weapons-ready as well? Indeed, what would prevent the world ElBaradei has repeatedly warned against from emerging: one with 20 or more states only days or weeks from a bomb, all primed to believe their nuclear capabilities might keep them safe? We know where the military build-up and mutual suspicions of 1914 led – to World Wars I and II, with over 100 million dead. Imagine a similar powder keg – only this time with nuclear-armed contestants stretching from Beijing to Washington and Algeria to Japan.

BACK TO NPT BASICS

If we wish to avoid the worst, we should back the NPT's original presumption in Article IV against the unnecessary spread of unsafeguardable nuclear activities and materials. In specific, states before, at, and after the NPT Review Conference should consider proposals to put the original view of Article IV into play for nuclear supplier- and nuclear recipient-states alike and, to the extent possible, for nonmembers of the NPT as well.

Among the steps that ought to be considered are:

- An indefinite freeze on any expansion anywhere of existing plutonium separation efforts, and of fuel fabrication plants that handle nuclear weapons-usable fuels, until methods can be devised to provide appropriate, timely detection and warning of diversions from these plants.

- A five-year, renewable moratorium on the expansion of any nation's net uranium enrichment capacity. Under this proposal, states could modernize existing capacity, but whatever new capacity they put up would have to be balanced by bringing down an equivalent amount of old capacity.
- A call for all states to compare openly any proposal to build or complete a large nuclear facility against alternatives that could produce similar benefits at less cost. Here the U.S. could best take the lead by upholding title V of the U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978. Under this law, the U.S. is "to cooperate with other nations, international institutions, and private organizations in establishing programs to assist in the development of non-nuclear energy resources." To date, key provisions of this law have not been implemented.
- An indefinite suspension of international transfers of nuclear weapons-usable materials, i.e., of highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium, unless the transfer's purpose is to dispose of the material or to make it less accessible for weapons use.
- A reassessment of the limitations of the IAEA's ability to safeguard the nuclear facilities and materials it monitors.


In each case, the NPT Review Conference could evaluate the merits of instituting or of extending each of these proposals every five years. This would give the NPT Review Conference important operational issues to focus on. More importantly, adopting one or more of these proposals would go a long way to making Article IV and "peaceful" nuclear power meaningful, i.e., to achieving the NPT's ultimate purpose. The alternative is to wait not only for more Irans, but the clear undoing of the NPT. ■

The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.

NORTH KOREA

A Rogue State Outside the NPT Fold

RALPH C. HASSIG AND KONGDAN OH



Problems with North Korea over nuclear proliferation are nothing new, say Ralph Hassig and Kongdan Oh. The regime started building nuclear reactors in the 1960s and did not join the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty until 1985. It announced in the early 1990s that it was withdrawing from the treaty, but suspended its withdrawal one day before it became effective. Then came the period under the Agreed Framework, which collapsed in 2002.

Ms. Oh is a research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Alexandria, Virginia, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Hassig is a Washington-based consultant on North Korean affairs. He has co-authored a book on North Korea and written numerous articles with Ms. Oh, his wife and research partner. Their website maybe accessed at <http://mysite.verizon.net/kohrch/>

The government of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK)—or North Korea—has never been in full compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which it acceded in 1985. The signing of a safeguards agreement that would permit International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of its nuclear program was postponed until 1992. When the overdue inspections suggested that the North Koreans were hiding nuclear material, the DPRK became the first country to announce its withdrawal from the NPT. Thanks to persuasion from the United States, in 1993 that withdrawal was “suspended” one day before it became effective. But under the Agreed Framework that North Korea negotiated with the United States in 1994, the IAEA was prevented from conducting the inspections it had requested. When the Agreed Framework finally collapsed in late 2002, North Korea pulled out of the NPT and the IAEA and boasted that it had begun building a nuclear deterrent.

North Korea’s nuclear program began in the mid-1950s, when a group of North Korean nuclear scientists received training in the Soviet Union. In the mid-1960s North Korea built two small nuclear research reactors with Soviet assistance and technology. Another nuclear reactor, generating five megawatts of electricity, was completed in 1986. [Editor’s note: According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, such a plant could generate

Photo above: This 1996 file photo shows spent nuclear fuel rods in a cooling pond at facilities in Yongbyon, North Korea. The photo was released in 2003 by the South Korean news agency, Yonhap. (AP Wide World Photos/Yonhap)

enough electricity to service about 4,000 U.S. households for a full year, if operated at full power continuously.] Although this reactor was too small to be connected to an electrical power grid, its spent fuel began to be reprocessed into weapons-grade plutonium—a clear violation of North Korea's NPT obligations. In 1984, construction began on a 50-megawatt reactor, and in 1991, on a 200-megawatt reactor, neither of which was ever completed. In the 1980s, the Soviets agreed to construct a light-water reactor (LWR) capable of generating 1,760 megawatts of electricity on the condition that the North Koreans join the NPT. Work stopped at an early stage when the North Koreans fell behind in their payments.

Under the 1994 Agreed Framework with the United States, North Korea's 5-megawatt reactor as well as its fuel reprocessing plant and associated facilities at Yongbyon were shut down, and construction on the 50-megawatt and 200-megawatt reactors was halted. The IAEA monitored the shut-down but was not permitted to conduct a complete investigation of North Korea's nuclear program until two 1,000 megawatt light-water reactors, to be built by a new consortium called the Korean Peninsula Development Organization, were well on their way to completion. The reactors would be constructed by the South Koreans, based on U.S. designs, and financed largely by South Korea and Japan. Light-water reactors are more "proliferation-resistant" than North Korea's gas-graphite reactors because the former require enriched uranium for fuel and, under normal operating conditions, the spent fuel produced by light-water reactors could not be reprocessed into weapons-grade plutonium with North Korea's present technology.

CALLED TO ACCOUNT

For a variety of reasons, construction on the two reactors, originally expected to be completed by 2003, fell far behind schedule. In the meantime, U.S. intelligence came to believe that the North Koreans were developing a clandestine uranium-enrichment program; such a program would be contrary to the North-South Denuclearization Declaration and therefore would violate the Agreed Framework. Called to account in an October 2002 meeting between the two governments, a North Korean official admitted the existence of the uranium program, but later denied the admission. The following month, the United States announced it was halting shipments of the half-million tons of heavy fuel oil it had been providing annually to North Korea as compensation for "lost" energy generating capacity. In December 2002, the North Koreans

expelled IAEA inspectors and removed IAEA seals and cameras from Yongbyon. In January 2003, the North Koreans announced that they had lifted their earlier "suspension" of their withdrawal from the NPT and asserted that their withdrawal was therefore effective the next day. They re-started their 5-megawatt reactor and later claimed that they had completed reprocessing the reactor's 8,000 spent fuel rods that had been under IAEA seal. Construction of the two light-water reactors, still at the foundation stage, was suspended in November 2003.

From fuel reprocessed before the Agreed Framework took effect in 1994, the North Koreans are thought to have accumulated at least 6-to-10 kilograms of plutonium, sufficient for one or two small nuclear bombs. Another half-dozen nuclear devices could be constructed from the estimated 20-35 kilograms of plutonium reprocessed from the 8,000 spent fuel rods. In a few years, when fuel can be unloaded from the re-started 5-megawatt reactor and reprocessed into plutonium, sufficient plutonium for one additional nuclear device a year could become available. If the 50-megawatt reactor is ever completed, it could—eventually—produce enough plutonium for 5-to-10 weapons a year, and of course the 200-megawatt reactor could produce even more. The output of North Korea's alleged uranium enrichment program is purely speculative because the scope of that program is unknown. Yet another possible source of nuclear material or ready-made weapons would be purchases from other countries or through a clandestine proliferation network.

The first U.S.-DPRK talks of substance convened in 1993 and continued on a stop-and-go basis into 1994, culminating in the signing of the Agreed Framework. Six four-party meetings (U.S., DPRK, South Korea, and China) were held between 1997 and 1999 to discuss North Korea's demand that the Korean War armistice be replaced by a peace treaty, but the talks eventually collapsed.

In April 2003, in the face of a U.S. refusal to meet bilaterally with North Korea, China played the host and arranged a three-party meeting, which expanded into a six-party forum (adding South Korea, Japan and Russia) for three six-party meetings beginning in August 2003.

In the six-party meetings, North Korea has offered to freeze its nuclear weapons program as soon as the United States resumes its fuel oil deliveries, lifts its economic embargo, and removes the DPRK from Washington's list of terrorist-sponsoring states. Learning from its experience with the Agreed Framework, the United States has insisted that only when North Korea verifiably freezes its nuclear program can the U.S. begin negotiating an economic aid package and a multilateral non-aggression pact.



AP Wide World Photos

The art of making threats. Showing missiles demolishing the U.S. Capitol building, the poster above was mounted on a shoe-factory wall in the North Korean city of Sinuiju. The text vows to “crush” the United States “if someone starts an invasion war.” The poster below is titled “The Targets are Clear” and depicts North Korean missiles closing in on a plane bearing the markings “Washington, Seoul, Tokyo.”



AP Wide World Photos/Korea News Service

North Korea’s neighbors—China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea—have on many occasions declared that they will not tolerate a North Korean nuclear weapons program. The United States has voiced its unalterable opposition as well. Yet no one has been able to stop North Korea from accumulating more nuclear material, and presumably building nuclear weapons. The Agreed Framework, negotiated by the Clinton administration, slowed but did not stop North Korea’s nuclear program. The Bush administration has avoided one-on-one talks because it considers North Korea’s proliferation to be a regional rather than bilateral issue, but the United States has agreed to meet with North Korea in a multilateral setting. Washington’s initial expectation was that the other members of the six-party talks would join the United States in pressuring North Korea to halt its nuclear program. What has happened in our view, however, is that Russia, China, and South Korea have shown a degree of sympathy for North Korea’s claim that it is a target of U.S. aggression in the Bush administration’s war on terrorism. These countries have called on the United States to compromise with North Korea, although no one has clearly laid out what that compromise would look like.

North Korea has offered to abandon its nuclear weapons program and accept an unspecified type of verification regime when the United States replaces its hostile policy toward the Kim Jong-il regime with acceptance, non-interference, and even support. But because U.S. policy is based not only on North Korea’s nuclear proliferation but also on its past behavior, its forward-deployed conventional weapons, and its abysmal human rights policies, there seems to be little prospect that any American administration would grant Kim Jong-il the respect and support he feels he deserves.

Most North Korea observers in the United States can agree that the North Koreans would stop producing more plutonium in return for a smorgasbord of rewards, but they doubt that “CVID” — a complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantling of North Korea’s entire nuclear program — could ever be accomplished as long as the Kim regime remains in power. So in practical terms, the issue becomes whether the U.S. will settle for another agreement that partially contains North Korea’s nuclear program, or whether the proliferation will be allowed to continue—at least until China, North Korea’s primary benefactor, becomes sufficiently alarmed to end its economic aid and diplomatic support for Kim’s regime. ■

The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.

NEW PLAYERS ON THE SCENE

A.Q. Khan and the Nuclear Black Market

COLONEL CHARLES D. LUTES



Current nonproliferation regimes “may be inadequate to deal with the emerging threat of non-state proliferation” that Pakistani nuclear scientist A.Q. Khan represents, according to U.S. Air Force Colonel Charles D. Lutes. He says that’s because these regimes are based on international norms, which in turn are based on the assumption that only governments are able to develop nuclear weapons.

A Senior Military Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C., Lutes says the Bush administration, recognizing this flawed assumption, has begun employing a two-tracked approach, attacking both supply of and demand for nuclear materials.

Photo above: An undated photo from Islamabad, Pakistan, of Abdul Qadeer Khan, founder of Pakistan’s nuclear program. (AP Wide World Photos)

In October 2003, Italian coast guard cutters pulled alongside a German-flagged cargo vessel bound for Libya called the *BBC China*. Upon inspection, authorities found precision machine tools, aluminum tubes, molecular pumps, and other components for building approximately 10,000 “P-2” gas centrifuges designed for enriching uranium to specifications required for a nuclear weapon.

These components were traced back to a publicly traded Malaysian engineering company called Scomi Precision Engineering. Scomi had manufactured the parts at the behest of a Sri Lankan, Buhary Sayed Abu Tahir. Via his front company in Dubai, SMB Computers, Tahir arranged to deliver the parts to Libya for its hidden nuclear weapons program.

The Italian authorities ensured that the cargo never arrived at its destination. The seizure of the *BBC China’s* cargo was a key part in a chain of events that led Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi to “come out of the cold” and renounce his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in December 2003.

Just as significantly, this interdiction operation was the strand that unraveled the shadowy proliferation network of Tahir's boss and mentor, Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan. [Note: The details on the *BBC China* seizure and the Khan network were derived from published sources. Specifically, see Bill Powell and Tim McGirk, "The Man Who Sold the Bomb," *Time*, February 14, 2005, pp. 22-30. Also see Barton Gellman and Dafna Lizner, "Unprecedented Peril Forces Tough Calls: President Faces a Multi-Front Battle Against Threats Known, Unknown," *The Washington Post*, October 26, 2004, p. A1.]

A NUCLEAR MARKETPLACE

The godfather of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, A.Q. Khan is a legendary and celebrated figure in his country for his years of secretive work in developing the first "Islamic bomb" to counter the threat from long-time rival India.

As a scientist working for the Dutch Urenco firm in the 1970s, Khan had access to blueprints for uranium enrichment technology, which he stole and brought back to Pakistan when he returned home.

Khan was appointed by then-Pakistani Prime Minister Ali Bhutto to run Pakistan's nuclear-research program, with the goal of countering India's nuclear aspirations with a weapon of its own. Running counter to the non-proliferation norms of the international community, Khan was forced to pursue this goal with the utmost secrecy. However, Pakistan's indigenous scientific and engineering infrastructure was underdeveloped for the task. So Khan did what any good entrepreneur would do: he outsourced.

He cultivated a network of suppliers and manufacturers, many of whom did not realize the ultimate objective of the science project undertaken at the Khan Research Laboratories. By 1998, however, there was no doubt. To the surprise of the international community, Pakistan completed five underground nuclear tests and joined an elite club of nuclear weapon states.

For A.Q. Khan, the patriotic fervor surrounding this achievement was only the beginning. A shrewd businessman, he saw potential for financial gain between his network of suppliers and a burgeoning market for nuclear arms. North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Libya were foremost on a list of those at least window-shopping for such capability.

An ongoing investigation reveals that the Khan network played a significant role, beginning in the early 1990s, in the development of Iranian and North Korean enrichment technology. In exchange, North Korea

appears to have shared its ballistic missile technology with Pakistan.

The investigation of the Libyan program continues to reap an intelligence bonanza uncovering the extent of Khan's cooperation with rogue regimes worldwide. While there is considerable debate over the role of the Pakistani government with regard to Khan's activities, it is unlikely that officials in Islamabad had full knowledge of the scope and scale of the Khan network.

As it continues to be exposed, the web of alleged Khan sponsors and suppliers is breathtaking. Starting with the stolen centrifuge designs from the Netherlands, and augmented by weapons designs from China, the syndicate also included engineering assistance from Britain; vacuum pumps from Germany; specialized lathes from Spain; furnaces from Italy; centrifuge motors and frequency converters from Turkey; enrichment parts from South Africa and Switzerland; aluminum from Singapore; and centrifuge parts from Malaysia, all orchestrated from an administrative hub in Dubai.

Despite mounting evidence, however, it is unlikely that the full extent of the network that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed El-Baradei dubbed "the nuclear Wal-Mart" will ever be fully known.

SUPPLY ALWAYS MEETS DEMAND

Now that A.Q. Khan is under house arrest in Pakistan, but unavailable to Western authorities for interrogation, vexing questions remain. It is clear that Khan met with, and possibly sold components to, officials in a number of nuclear-aspiring states. Ongoing investigation has linked Khan to nuclear programs in Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Libya. Additionally, published reports have identified Khan meetings with potential customers in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Algeria, Kuwait, Myanmar, and Abu Dhabi. The wider the spread of this dangerous knowledge and expertise, the greater the opportunity exists for terrorists or criminals to become armed with a nuclear bomb.

Clearly, al-Qaida and its affiliates are in the market for nuclear weapons. On the one hand, Khan's far-flung conglomeration of shady manufacturers, unsavory middlemen, and illicit traffickers seems the ideal supplier to meet the terrorist demand for nuclear arms. Its loosely coupled network mirrors the cellular structure favored by al-Qaida-affiliated terrorists. This structure facilitates surreptitious and relatively untraceable transactions among those who wish to wreak catastrophic violence.



This building in Almaty, Kazakhstan, photographed on February 18, 2004, was reported to house an office of SMB Computers, a Dubai company linked to the global nuclear black market. In a February 11, 2004, speech, President George W. Bush said, "a man named B.S.A. Tahir ran SMB Computers... as a front for the proliferation activities of the A.Q. Khan network." (Serik Kovlanbayev, AP Wide World Photos)

On the other hand, in considering the terrorist link it is important to look at the wares that Khan and his cronies offered for sale. Primarily, Khan purveyed the necessary materiel for a state nuclear program: centrifuge components and designs, weapons blueprints, and technical expertise. There are no published reports of Khan dealing in nuclear fissile material itself, the final product of the enrichment process that fuels a nuclear weapon.

Presumably terrorists would prefer to purchase a finished weapon or, at a minimum, the fissile material, as they likely have little ability or patience to develop a program infrastructure. To a terrorist, then, dealing with Khan would be tantamount to asking for AK-47s and bullets, and instead receiving steel, metal casts and molds, and a fabrication instruction manual.

As much damage as the black market may have done in bringing North Korea and Iran closer to membership in the nuclear club, the present danger lies in how the supplier network adapts now that Khan is no longer at the helm.

Although President Bush has stated that Khan's network has been shut down, it remains possible that parts of it may have just burrowed more deeply underground. While it is unlikely that Khan Research Laboratories will

engage in any further black market activity, it remains to be seen what will become of its associates.

Just as terrorist networks re-form and adapt, so too can the supplier network. The predominant commodity will be the knowledge base and expertise resident in the remaining supplier nodes. Cut off from Khan's access to the rogue state market, a new network of nuclear scientists and engineers may coalesce around the terrorist market.

To the extent that these profiteers may have any access to fissile material or even a finished weapon, the risk of proliferation to terrorists increases exponentially. Unfortunately in the case of terrorist actors, unlike state actors, possessing a nuclear weapon probably has only one purpose: for detonation into a visible mushroom cloud.

From Cooperative Agreements to Cooperative Action

Existing nonproliferation regimes may be inadequate to deal with the emerging threat of non-state proliferation as exemplified by the Khan nuclear smuggling network. International norms—the basis of these regimes—are predicated on an assumption that only states have the requisite resources to develop nuclear weapons.

The Khan experience, viewed through a new set of assumptions in a post-9/11 world, indicates that this basic premise is flawed. For this reason, the Bush administration has begun prodding the international community to move from a position of cooperative agreements to one of cooperative action.

Accordingly, the United States and its partners have developed a more proactive approach to attack both ends of the problem. To curb demand, the war on terrorism seeks to defeat terrorist groups in the short term, while undermining terrorist ideology and support over the long term. Against rogue states, international diplomatic pressure backed by threat of force is aimed at isolating outlaw regimes. The experience in Iraq shows the challenges of this policy when conducted with limited international consensus.

On the supply front, two approaches are currently in play. The first is to round up the relatively limited supply of fissile material. Threat reduction techniques applied to the former Soviet states have been extended on an international scale through the G-8 Global Threat Reduction Initiative. A recent agreement between the U.S. and Russia to enhance cooperation in the fight against nuclear terrorism is another example.

The second approach is embodied by the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), under which participating gov-



ernments collaborate to interdict shipments of components and material needed to construct weapons of mass destruction. The slogan that PSI is “an activity, not an organization” reflects the paradigm shift toward cooperative action. It was cooperation under the PSI principles that led to the interception of the *BBC China* and the unraveling of the Khan network.

However, the black-market activities of A.Q. Khan may only be the tip of the iceberg. As long as there is significant demand for nuclear capability, suppliers will try to find ways to meet it. The international community must be flexible in its approach in order to confront the ever-changing nature of the nuclear supplier network. The shift from cooperative agreements to cooperative action to curb both demand and supply is a necessary ingredient for success. ■

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Defense University, the U.S. Air Force, or the United States government.



U.S. Navy photo
Below: Katsumi Kasahara,
AP Wide World Photos



Proliferation Security Initiative training. International forces practice interdiction techniques. Top, Special Operations Forces from Spain search a sailor after boarding the USNS *Saturn* during the 15-nation Sea Saber 2004 exercise, January 17, 2004. Middle, Inspectors from Japan's National Police Agency wear protective suits to analyze materials loaded in a container during an export control exercise in Tokyo, October 22, 2004. Bottom, Italian firefighters wearing protective suits against chemical, biological, and radiological contaminants set up warning signs around a container suspected of carrying weapons of mass destruction during the exercise *Clever Sentinel 2004* on April 22, 2004, in Sicily.

NOT WITH A WHIMPER

Visions of Mass Destruction in Fiction and Film

RICHARD PELLIS



It has so far proven very “difficult for novelists or filmmakers to portray the mentality of the stateless terrorist, the messianic fanatic who seeks to murder people indiscriminately, for no obvious purpose except to pile up the bodies,” says Richard Pellis, professor of history at the University of Texas at Austin. Particularly during the Cold War, Pellis says, many novelists and filmmakers worked “with utmost seriousness” to “make comprehensible our universal peril.”

The author of three books, Pellis is currently at work on From Modernism to the Movies: The Globalization of American Culture in the Twentieth Century.

*“This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
This is the way the world ends
Not with a bang but a whimper”*

— T.S. Eliot, The Hollow Men

One of the most famous paintings of the 20th century is Pablo Picasso’s *Guernica*. There is a good, if frightening, reason for its fame. A commemoration of the bombing of a Basque town by German and Italian planes during the Spanish Civil War, the painting portrays the agony and terror of people and animals being obliterated by modern weapons of mass destruction. *Guernica* is also a premonition of the even more savage attacks on civilian populations during World War II, as well as of a world filled with nuclear and biological weapons—a world in which we all now live.

Since the end of World War II, we have often depended on artists to make comprehensible our universal peril, to measure our chances for survival in an age when innocent people can be instantly gassed, asphyxiated with

Photo above: Pablo Picasso’s painting *Guernica* hangs in the Reina Sofia art museum in Madrid, Spain. (Santiago Lyon, APWide World Photos)

deadly toxins, or incinerated. And many novelists and filmmakers have done so with the utmost seriousness, particularly during the Cold War.

The prospect of nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States yielded at least two best-selling novels in the 1950s and early 1960s. Nevil Shute's *On the Beach* (published in 1957, and made into a movie with an all-star cast in 1959, then remade as a mini-series for U.S. television in 2000) described the effects of radiation as the planet slowly died in the aftermath of a nuclear exchange between the superpowers. Eugene Burdick's *Fail Safe* was published in 1962, the same year as the Cuban missile crisis, the one moment in the Cold War when the United States and the Soviet Union might have actually used their nuclear arsenals against each other. The movie version of *Fail Safe*, in 1964, starred Henry Fonda as an American president confronted with an accidental attack on the Soviet Union; he decides to drop an atomic bomb on New York in compensation for the annihilation of Moscow.

Yet it is impossible for people to live in perpetual fear. Or to imagine the insanity of a nuclear war without a dose of dark humor. In 1958, the great satirical song-writer, Tom Lehrer, composed an ode to the end of the world, titled "We Will All Go Together When We Go." A sample verse: "We will all burn together when we burn/There'll be no need to stand and wait your turn/When it's time for the fall-out and Saint Peter calls us all out/We'll just drop our agendas and adjourn."

But no novel or film during the Cold War captured the lunacy of our situation more memorably than Stanley Kubrick's *Dr. Strangelove* (1964). Its subtitle was *How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*. This time nuclear war, "toe to toe with the Russkies," is no accident; it's launched by a crazed American General, Jack D. Ripper, worried about a "Commie plot" to put fluoride in the drinking water and cause the loss of his bodily essences. With Peter Sellers in three roles—as a British officer (the lone voice of reason in the

movie) detailed to General Ripper and frantically trying to figure out the code that will recall the American bombers, the U.S. president (far more muddled than Henry Fonda), and an ex-Nazi scientist who understands not only the "Doomsday" machine that will blow up the world but the postwar mine shafts that will house the survivors—*Dr. Strangelove* ends with mushroom clouds and images of oblivion more mordant, and more chilling, than any other work of art or entertainment in the Cold War years.

Still, the Cold War—however grim—was familiar and oddly comforting. It was, after all, a contest between two nation-states, each with a lot to lose. Policymakers on both sides understood the rules of the game, and

the limits beyond which they couldn't go. General Ripper may have gone "a little funny in the head," but most of the Cold War protagonists—in art and reality—weren't psychopaths. They were, like Henry Fonda, cool customers, rational custodians of terrifying weapons, trying never to miscalculate. Or, as Peter Sellers' American President tells the Soviet Premier: "We're in this together, Dmitri. Don't say you're sorrier than I am; I'm just as sorry as you."

This sense of the Cold War as a competition between adversaries, rather than as a hunger for Armageddon, explains why so many of the era's spy novels are really psychological thrillers, with agents maneuvering for tiny advantages against their equals in an interminable chess match where ultimate "victory" is not achievable. The focus here is on the tradecraft, duplicity, and cleverness of the spy—as in

the novels of John Le Carré, whose British agent George Smiley plays intricate intelligence games with his Soviet KGB counterpart, Karla. Both behave with restraint and mutual respect, befitting professional spies with peculiar codes of honor in the midst of the Cold War, but who can never come in from the cold.

The Cold War, and the dangers of a nuclear conflagration, were at least imaginable in fiction and films. Perhaps this was because nuclear weapons were always seen as the



Actor Peter Sellers sits in a wheelchair portraying the titular character in director Stanley Kubrick's 1964 movie, *Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb*. (AP Wide World Photos)

property of and controllable by a state. States are not suicidal—not even “rogue” states like Iran or North Korea. So their governments are normally susceptible to negotiation or pressure. The conflicts between members of the nuclear “club,” we assume, can somehow be managed by experts in throw-weights and multiple warheads.

It has, however, been much more difficult for novelists or filmmakers to portray the mentality of the stateless terrorist, the messianic fanatic who seeks to murder people indiscriminately, for no obvious purpose except to pile up the bodies. And who is willing to use any means—from car bombs to hijacked planes to nuclear and biological weapons—to accomplish the mission.

From the 1960s on, there have been efforts to penetrate the terrorist’s mind. The James Bond films usually featured a megalomaniac bent on obtaining a weapon of mass destruction with which he could take command of the planet. Yet the Bond movies, with their spectacular explosions amid the vodka martinis, exuded amusement and charm rather than horror. In 1983, Le Carré, taking a vacation from the intrigues of Smiley and Karla, sought to decipher the psychology of Palestinian terrorists in *The Little Drummer Girl*. But the novel (and the 1984 film on which it was based) was more about the cerebral struggle between Israeli intelligence agents and their Palestinian foes than about mass murder.

More recently, films like *The Rock* and *The Devil’s Own* portray the quest for weapons in the service of either a political movement or personal grievance. In the case of *The Rock*, Ed Harris is the leader of a gang of ex-military thugs who’ve taken over Alcatraz Island in the middle of San Francisco Bay, once a federal prison site, and are threatening to unleash chemical weapons on San Francisco. But Harris and his band are out for money and revenge; they don’t yearn to ascend to heaven through an act of martyrdom. Meanwhile, in *The Devil’s Own*, Brad Pitt plays an Irish Republican Army operative who comes to the

U.S. to purchase guns and rockets, not nuclear or biological weapons. And, like the Palestinians in *The Little Drummer Girl*, he’s a killer because he wants to create a state. His targets are deliberate (the British and Northern Ireland Protestants); he’s not thirsting to massacre everyone in sight. In yet another film, 1997’s *The Peacemaker*, starring George Clooney and Nicole Kidman, Russian nuclear warheads are stolen, and a weaponized backpack eventually ends up in the hands of a Bosnian Serb terrorist determined to destroy Manhattan. His motivation is also revenge and money.

Above all, these terrorists are not in love with death; they concoct strategies that, however implausible, will allow them to escape and continue to fight for the “cause.” What novelists and filmmakers have not yet fully envisioned is terror for its own sake—without rules, codes, or limits. Nor have they imagined a state of mind in which suicide is the road to sainthood. And so all of us, not just in the West, are in a frightening void, without the “comforts” of the Cold War or the art forms it inspired.

Clearly, the international community needs to strengthen the treaties and protocols that will control the proliferation of nuclear and biological weapons developed by countries and by non-state terrorists, and to continue to deal with the menace of terrorism through a variety of legal means. But we also need, in the 21st century, another Pablo Picasso or a Stanley Kubrick to warn us of what our fate will be if we don’t superintend the horrific weapons we have created. Otherwise, as Picasso and Kubrick both knew, our world may end with a bang, not with a whimper. ■

The opinions expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the U.S. government.



Duck and Cover

STARRING BERT THE TURTLE



Dan Grossi, AP Wide World Photos

In 1951, the newly established Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) commissioned production of a film to instruct children how to react in the event of a nuclear attack. The result was *Duck and Cover*, a film lasting nine minutes that was shown in schools throughout the United States during the 1950s and beyond. It featured a cartoon character, Bert the Turtle, who “was very alert” and “knew just what to do: duck and cover.” At the sound of an alarm or the flash of a brilliant light signaling a nuclear explosion, Bert would instantly tuck his body under his shell. Above, in a photo from November 21, 1951, sixth-grade students and their teacher at Public School 152 in the Queens borough of New York City, act out a scene depicted in the film by crouching under or beside their desks.

Other FCDA initiatives of the early 1950s led to creation of the Emergency Broadcast System, food stockpiles, civil defense classes, and public and private bomb shelters. At right, a mother and her children practice running to their steel-walled fallout shelter in



Sal Veder, AP Wide World Photos

the back yard of their Sacramento, California, home on October 5, 1961.

The FCDA commissioned other civil defense films, but *Duck and Cover* became the most famous of the genre. In 2004, the U.S. Library of Congress added it to the National Film Registry

of “culturally, historically, or aesthetically” significant motion pictures, a distinction it now shares with such feature-film classics as *Birth of a Nation*, *Casablanca*, and *Schindler’s List*. ■

(You can see *Duck and Cover* on your computer screen by going to this Internet site: <http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0305/ijpelfullversion.htm>)

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INTERNET RESOURCES

Online resources for information about nonproliferation and terrorism issues

ACADEMIC

Harvard University: John F. Kennedy School of Government: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: Managing the Atom
http://bcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/research.cfm?program=STPP&ln=home&pb_id=240&gma=27&gmi=47

Monterey Institute of International Studies: Center for Nonproliferation Studies
<http://cns.miis.edu/>

Princeton University: The Program on Science and Global Security
<http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/>

Stanford University: Institute for International Studies: Center for International Security and Cooperation
<http://cisac.stanford.edu/>

INTERNATIONAL

British American Security Information Council: Nuclear and WMD
<http://www.basicint.org/nuclear/nucindex.htm>

International Atomic Energy Agency
<http://www.iaea.org/>

International Science and Technology Center
<http://www.istc.ru/>

Proliferation Security Initiative
<http://www.proliferationsecurity.info/introduction.php>

United Nations: Peace and Security through Disarmament
<http://disarmament2.un.org/>

U.S. GOVERNMENT

National Defense University: Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction
<http://www.ndu.edu/WMDCenter/>

U.S. Department of Defense: Weapons of Mass Destruction
<http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/destruction/>

U.S. Department of Energy: Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
<http://ipp.nn.doe.gov/>

U.S. Department of Energy: National Nuclear Security Administration: Office of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
<http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/program.shtml>

U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Nonproliferation: 2005 NPT Review Conference
<http://www.state.gov/t/np/wmd/nnp/c10602.htm>

U.S. Department of State: Bureau of Nonproliferation: Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund
<http://www.ndf.org/>

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<http://www.state.gov/t/np/c10390.htm>

U.S. Department of State: International Information Programs: Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
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U.S. Department of State: Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security
<http://www.state.gov/t/>

U.S. ORGANIZATIONS

Arms Control Association: 2005 Campaign to Strengthen the NPT: NPT Resources
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Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Proliferation News and Resources
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/>

Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute
<http://www.cbaci.org/cbaci/>

Council on Foreign Relations: Weapons of Mass Destruction
<http://www.cfrterrorism.org/weapons/>

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
<http://www.npec-web.org/>

Nuclear Control Institute
<http://www.nci.org/>

The Stimson Center: Current Projects: Reducing the Threat of WMD
<http://www.stimson.org/?SN=TI20011220106>

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